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Abstract
The relationship between Church and State in Russia is an ongoing and dynamic 
process. This thesis is a study of that process. It begins by outlining various 
theoretical approaches, reviews the relevant history of this relationship, and then 
attempts a characterization of the present dynamics between the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Russian state. The political and social consequences of these 
dynamics are then assessed using two different case studies. The thesis then 
concludes that the roles of tradition and history are important elements in 
determining the actions within the political arena and both tradition and alliances are 
cards that are played in order to gain legitimacy, by both the state and the Church. 
The methodology of this thesis was strongly based on a literature review. It is an 
independent application of the theoretical models of Church-state relations in the 
context of Russia.
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Introduction
The history of Russia is unlike that of any other nation in the modern 
world. Church-state relations in Russia are also unique in both their 
development and the way in which they manifest themselves to both Russian 
society and to the world. Like any other relationship, the relationship between 
the Russian Orthodox Church and state has been formulated through a process 
that has occurred over time. The purpose of this thesis is to look at that 
relationship and at the process through which it has acquired its determining 
characteristics, which we currently find in Russia.
The role of religion in society is not a new debate, although it seems that it 
is becoming a more noticeable dialogue on the public stage. Given the claim of 
moral disintegration in modern society, what role religion plays, and whether it 
should play any role at all is more relevant today than ever before. This thesis is 
a direct link to that dialogue. The relationship between Church and state is a 
modern and politically volatile debate, in Russia and elsewhere in the world. 
This thesis will examine the degree to which theoretical models on Church-state 
relations can inform our understanding of contemporary Russia.
This research was addressed through an extensive literature review of the 
theoretical models of Church and state relations, the relevant history of Russia, 
and current representations of the relationship between the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Russian state. Through the literature review an ethnohistory of
Church-state relations is developed which provides information for the practical 
application of the theory to current dynamics between the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the Russian state, as well as an analysis of two case studies that 
allude to the theoretical model that most appropriately defines the current 
relationship.
The first chapter of this thesis delves into the theoretical models of 
relationships that have been developed to describe Church-state relations. 
Specifically, three models are discussed: complete separation (also known as 
secularization), weak establishment, and symphonia. These three models were 
chosen for analysis as they, for the purposes of this thesis, represent points on an 
arc connecting varying political and religious sentiments. The idea of symphonia 
is hard for some people to comprehend, especially those resident in North 
America where Church and state are kept relatively separate and where states 
embrace the philosophy of Church and state separation. Outside the Western 
tradition, however, symphonia is a more established practice, especially in the 
Orthodox world.
The second chapter discusses the history of Russia and passes through 
many centuries in order to give the reader an understanding of the foundation 
on which the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and state in 
Russia developed. The reader will note that this relationship goes through many 
extreme changes throughout the history of Imperial Russia and later, through the 
history of the Soviet Union. This chapter concludes with the beginning of the
end of the Soviet Union in 1988. The year 1988 is a natural break as the changes 
of glasnost and perestroika under Gorbachev begin to fall into place.
Chapter Three continues the saga through the last years of the Soviet 
Union, from 1988 to 1991. This period was a time of great change in both the 
Church and the state, which are not independent from one another. This period 
presented an opportunity to reinvent the relationship between the Russian 
Orthodox Church and the Soviet state. The Church used this time to re-establish 
itself in the minds of Russians while the state struggled to institutionalize 
Gorbachev's seemingly liberal reforms of perestroika and glasnost.
Chapter Four begins with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 
continues up until 2005. The chapter covers the extensive changes that occurred 
in the relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the new Russian 
Federation, and follows the link between that relationship and the perception 
and value of the Church in Russian society. While the Soviet ideology crashed 
down around them, people looked to the Church to fill the void.
The next chapter includes two case studies which outline the influence 
that the Russian Orthodox Church has had over the state. This period, during 
the 1990s, is unique in that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian 
Orthodox Church feels the pressure of the presence of foreign religions to a 
much larger extent than in the past. As well, society is adapting to the influence 
from the West and the new found freedoms of self expression and ideology. This 
period may be a time for the formation of "modern" relations between the new
Russian state and the Church. It is also a test of the boundaries for the Russian 
Orthodox Church in the public sphere.
The final chapter of this thesis summarizes the conclusions drawn on the 
development and current reality of Church-state relations in Russia. This thesis 
does not aim to resolve the issues of Church-state relations in Russia, nor 
suggest which theoretical approach would be best applied to the Church, state 
and society in Russia. However, it does aim to give a solid synopsis of where 
relations between the Church and state in Russia have been, some explanation as 
to why current relations are such that they are, and what might be expected in 
the future.
Chapter One 
Political Theory
The history of Church-state relations can be likened to the movement of a 
pendulum on an arc -  from one extreme to another and everywhere in between. 
This arc encompasses an extremely wide variety of points and perspectives 
concerning the role of religion in society, the relevance of Churches within a 
polity, and also the role of the state itself. All these points and perspectives are 
more than abstract notions and theoretical arguments, and are manifested in 
public and private discourse around the world as citizens and communities , 
engage in the ongoing contest of ideas. Debates concerning the role of religion 
and the relationship between Church and state may be fuelled by a variety of 
other concerns, such as a perceived decline of morality, a nationalist resurgence, 
or the secularization of society that often accompanies liberal democracy. In 
post-Soviet Russia, such debates take on special significance.
Most western states pride themselves on keeping the Church relatively 
separate from the state and religious belief is considered to be a private matter. 
Within most Muslim societies however, the Church and state are not separate at 
all and the political systems under Islamic law can be described as theocracies. 
Islamic law is the law of all and controls all public and private matters. 
Government and religion are one. Thus, in the contemporary world, we can find 
the secularism of the West and the theocracy of Islam as well as many variations
of models that lie between. In addition to these variations over space, we also 
find variations over time: for example, Iran of the 1960s had a different 
relationship between Church and state than we find today. All nations 
experience a fluctuation in Church-state relations. These fluctuations are more 
dramatic in some nations than others. The aim of this thesis is to examine this 
foundation in the Russian Federation and its predecessors. Imperial Russia and 
the Soviet Union.
In the Bible, Matthew 22:21, Jesus states "Render therefore to Caesar the 
things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's". This was 
interpreted in different ways, but by many Christians it was taken to mean that 
the two powers should be balanced, yet distinct and autonomous in their own 
spheres. Occasionally these lines were blurred, sometimes by design, sometimes 
by default. During the Middle Ages in Christian Europe, for example, the 
Church was the only institution that provided education to individuals who, 
upon completion, received secular administrative positions within each 
kingdom. In 1534 Henry VIII established a state Church with the Act of 
Supremacy -  the Church of England. With this, power shifted from the Church 
over the state to the state over the Church. The Protestant Reformation changed 
the structure of power to one in which the state rose over the Church, and the 
relationship became that of "two s w o r d s . E v e n  at this time, however, there
' S.L. Jenkinson, "Church and State" in David Miller, et al, eds.. The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of 
Political Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), 69- 70.
was discussion regarding whether or not the separation of Church and state was 
good for society: "Could a Christian justify a state at all in which a secular 
sovereign rather than a religious leader decided what was right or wrong?"^ 
Within the writings of Hobbes' Leviathan the two swords, as an ideal model of 
Church-state relations, were replaced by a single secular ruler of both the state 
and Church. In practice, relationships between Church and state continued to 
oscillate across time and space, but the primary agent in Church-state relations in 
the West, after the reformation, was the state. And so, in most of the Western 
societies, the Church has progressed or regressed, depending on one's position, 
from being a ruler, to a partner, to an agent, to being a voluntary body 
responsible for moral education.^
On the one hand, the degree to which the state is kept separate from the 
Church has been variably maintained over the centuries in most of the Western 
states that are secularized. On the other hand, the debate on the exact role of the 
Church in Western society has continued. Three primary models to describe 
Church and state relations have emerged. These three models each have their 
own strengths and weaknesses and are primarily descriptive, rather than 
prescriptive. Since each model also represents a political relationship however, 
each model leads to consequences for society and the state. This debate will also 
be studied here.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
The three models that reflect Church-state relations which will be 
discussed here are: complete separation, in support of keeping the state secular; 
symphonia^, which has the Church and state working together in partnership; and 
weak-establishment, which is the middle ground in which there is some 
consultation between each.s Veit Bader would add two other possibilities: 
constitutional pluralism and unconstitutional pluralism - both of which will be 
discussed in greater detail later.  ^ Of course, it would be simpler if politics were 
this black and white, but the real world of politics is a much more complex. 
Church-state relations can also fall anywhere in between. As more countries 
encounter the diversity of faiths (or lack of faith, as the case may be), there is an 
ongoing debate as to the role of religion and the Church in the political sphere. 
An example close to home comes to mind: the former president of the Canadian 
Society of Muslims has advocated for the right to punish Muslims who convert 
to other faiths.^ While this conflicts with constitutional rights given in Canada by 
the Charter o f Rights and Freedoms, advocates for the imposition of Shar'iah Law in 
Canada argue that religious law should transcend constitutional rights.
4 Zoe Knox, "The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate's Post-Soviet Leadership" Europe- 
Asia Studies, Vol. 55, No.4 (2003): 575-596.
5 Tariq Modood, "Introduction: Establishment, Reform and Multiculturalism" in Tariq Modood, 
ed.. Church, State and Religious Minorities, (England, Policy Studies Institute, 1997), 3 -  15.
6 Veit Bader, "Religious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy?" Political Theory 27, no. 
5 (October 1999): 597 -  633.
 ^To leave Islam is one of the Hadd crimes, considered to be the most serious crimes, and is 
punishable under the Qur'an. The punishment for this crime is not negotiable as it is written 
specifically in the Qur'an. More liberal followers do not consider apostasy from Islam a Hadd 
crime, but a lesser crime under Tazir (information from the Canadian Society of Muslims web site 
http://  mushm-canada.org/ lslam_myths.htm).
The first model for Church-state relations presented here is complete 
separation. A  primarily secular society supports a separation between Church 
and state. The proponents for a secular state believe that the only way to prevent 
religious underpinnings in the general fibre of public decision-making is to 
create "walls of separation" between Church and state. To support a secular 
state is to believe that ethics are innate in human nature, not contrived, and do 
not need to be supported by religious law. Religion is not necessary to establish 
the ethical fibre of society, and in fact, it is better kept out of the political realm 
altogether since it favours those who follow a given system of beliefs, those of 
the dominant religion of society, and infringes upon the rights and liberties of 
those who do not embrace those beliefs. That is not to say, however, that 
personal religious beliefs do not influence political decision-making, as can be 
seen with the second Bush administration in the United States. Those who 
advocate complete separation presuppose a neutral state, which favours no one 
faith or group. Religion, it follows, is a private affair. This secular position is 
strongly supported by Robert Audi and Stephen Macedo.®
Macedo argues for liberalism. Essentially, he advocates the separation of 
Church and state and notes, "politics should respect religious freedom. There 
are, however, a few serious objections to this position. Bader, for one, would
® Robert Audi, "The separation of Church and State and the obligation of the citizenship" 
Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 18 (1989): 259 - 296. Audi represents the most extremist view  of 
a secular State, whereas Macedo is more of a moderate secularist.
® Stephen Macedo, "Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending the 
Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism" Political Theory Vol. 26, No. 1 (February 1998): 56 -  80.
argue that a neutral state does not exist and that the attainment of one is a 
utopian dream. He continues to argue that the state cannot have "difference 
bIindness"io but must try to cultivate a respect for those differences, as well as a 
certain level of sensitivity. Macedo admits that liberalism is dependent on 
religious beliefs in order to have sustainable liberal political order. Tolerance, for 
example, one of the main facets of liberalism, is seen by many as a religious 
virtue. But Macedo also argues that while religions can flourish in a liberal 
society, they need to be the "right sort" of religions to thrive. It is not just 
politics, however, that need to be shielded from conservative religious 
movements, but that "separation serves to protect our politics from sectarian 
religious interventions and also to protect religion from the worldly influence of 
politics. "11
Secondly, in a realm that supports the secular voices and relies on the 
neutrality of the law, where are the voices of religion? A concern of religious 
groups is that without a religious voice in public affairs the morality of society is 
based, at least publicly, on secular ideology. In a secular state, religious life is 
private and people are free to practise their religion behind closed doors and out 
of the public sphere. But why should the separation of Church and state lead to 
the separation of religion and politics where religious beliefs are relegated to the
"Difference blindness" is to make the assumption that a group is homogenous, in regards to this 
discussion, homogenous in religious beliefs.
Macedo, 75.
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private sector and nearly banished from the public square, having limited 
influence in secular states?
Such concerns are raised by proponents of separation. Robert Audi, for 
example, states that the state and Church should be separate in a "free and 
democratic society,"!^ although he is not deaf to the voices of religion. He feels 
that people should be free to practice whatever religion they like, as long as it 
falls within the proper human rights standards, a rule he describes as the 
libertarian principle. He argues that there should be no preference for any religion 
-  known as the equalitarian principle; and finally, there should be no preference 
for religious institutions, what he describes as the neutrality principle. As to the 
role of religion in the public sphere, Audi believes that religious groups should 
not show favouritism towards any specific candidate or any public policy, 
especially when that policy is linked to a specific political party -  something he 
cites as an "institutional principle of n e u t r a l i t y . Audi's other principles 
include an "individual principle of political neutrality"^^ which applies 
specifically to clergy, as well as the "principle of c o n s c i e n c e , " ! ^  which applies to 
any individual. The latter principle states that people should not fight for limits 
on individual freedoms without a sound secular reason. Audi states that sound 
secular reasoning would "not depend on the existence of God."!^ Other
i2Audi, 261.
13 Audi, 274.
14 Audi, 277.
15 Audi, 278. 
15 Audi, 278.
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principles that Audi outlines in support of the separation of Church and state 
include:
i) principle of secular rationale,
ii) principle of secular advocacy in which religion is kept entirely out
of the public debate,
iii) principle of secular resolution whereby policy decisions should 
only be made through secular considerations,
iv) principle of secular motivations^, an individual should only be
motivated by secular reason in the public sphere.s®
Audi's main argument for separation is that one person, in the public sphere,
should not oppose the actions of another on the basis of religious beliefs. Audi
believes that an individual can be moral without being religious, as "moral truths
do not depend on religious ones."s^ Audi finally argues that separation is good
for pluralism, or a multi-faith society, as there is no need for competing religious
beliefs on public issues, such as abortion or capital punishment. He also states
that despite differences in religious beliefs, a core moral order can be agreed
upon that is not dependent on one religious faith. His final note on the subject is
stated thusly.
But a free society m ust still constantly respect, and, in some cases, legally 
guarantee, principles of separation of Church and state. We are prone to 
extremes in the service of our holy causes. Conflicting secular ideas, even 
when firmly held, can often be blended and harmonized in the crucible of
Within this principle Audi also differentiates between: "principle of essential secular 
motivation", an individual must be motivated primarily by secular reasons, not by rehgious 
behefs. (Audi States this as "secular reason must be necessary for one's actions rather than just 
sufficient") and "principle of partial secular motivation", or the principle that secular reason 
must be some part of an individual's motivation.
18 Audi, 279 -  286.
19 Audi, 292.
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free discussion; but a clash of gods is like a meeting of an irresistible force 
with an immovable o b j e c t . ^ o
An opposing viewpoint is given by Richard Neuhaus. According to 
Neuhaus, the removal of religion from public life creates the "naked public 
s q u a r e .  "21 The state is expected to fill the void that is left from the removal of 
religion and to do so creates a civil religion. The "burden [is] on [the] law to act 
religiously without being suspected of committing religion," creating a secular 
humanism. Neuhaus further argues that religion is the foundation for the 
perpetuation of the traditions of society. Society cannot be separated from the 
state without the delegitimization of the state - to have a state with no religion, or 
vice versa, is to head down the road to totalitarianism because no other actors are 
in the arena to keep the state, or the Church, in check. Morality is created by the 
state and is not faith-based or, religiously based. The state becomes the religion. 
Neuhaus proposes that the state is just one actor among many, all of whom work 
together for society while maintaining their independence from each other, 
religion being one of those actors. In all, Neuhaus does not support a completely 
secular state and supports a pluralist society in which there are a multitude of 
actors and institutions, including religion, all working in cooperation and 
competition, in order to further the process of democracy.
The second model for Church-state relations to be discussed here is that 
of weak establishment. In this relationship there is a flexible link between the state
20 Audi, 296.
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and religion, and while there may be one Church of the majority that may have 
more access to the state, essentially all religions have access. One advocate for 
this model is Veit Bader. Bader disagrees that complete separation is the best 
thing for society, and in fact states that some of the main arguments for complete 
separation, neutrality being one, is impossible to achieve. In his article "Religious 
Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy" Bader poses two questions: 
does religious freedom and equal treatment of religions require disestablishment 
of religion, and does political equality require complete separation? In Bader's 
view, liberal philosophers "believe that... values of freedom, equality and 
toleration are best preserved if religion is removed from public affairs."^
Among these "liberal philosophers," Bader targets Audi. Bader argues 
that in the real world, states are not neutral and that distinctions used so freely 
by liberal thinkers, such as public - private and social - political, are never as 
clear as they would have one believe. Bader even goes so far as to state that a 
separation of religion from the public - political sphere may be a disadvantage to 
society because not all voices are being heard and the view that religion is a 
threat to political stability is outdated. "It is possible for a state not to have an 
established Church, but the state cannot help but give partial establishment to a 
culture" .23 Despite the best efforts of a state to be neutral, it will always bow to
21 Richard John Neuhaus, "The Vulnerabihty of the Naked Square" in Good Order: Right Answers to 
Contemporary Questions, ed. Brad Miner (New York, NY, Touchstone, 1995): 58 -  77.
22 Veit Bader, "Rehgious Pluralism: Secularism or Priority for Democracy?" Political Theory 27, no. 
5 (October 1999): 598.
23 Bader, 603.
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whatever culture is dominant at the moment, regardless of whether it is based on 
religion or not. In Audi's argument, secular philosophy is preferred over 
religious. Further, the dichotomy between faith and religion should be 
distinguished in that religion is more institutional, whereas faith is linked to 
belief patterns and culture that may not necessarily be aligned with any 
institution.
To emphasize this "myth of neutrality," Bader uses the case point of the 
United States -  one of the first modern states to constitutionalize a separation of 
Church and state. One does not need to look too deeply into American culture to 
see how saturated everyday things are with Christian undertones: the phrase "In 
God We Trust" on the U.S. currency is a prime example. Bader supports 
discarding the "separation metaphor" for four reasons:
1. it deflects attention from more fundamental principles (e.g. liberty, 
equality, tolerance) that undergird the two clauses^^,
2. it conceptualizes Church-state relations in singular and monolithic 
terms,
3. it conceals the variety of ways in which Church and state interact, and
4. it constrains our ability to imagine new possibilities for their relation.^s
His position is that it should not matter whether a state is secular or religious, 
but whether its system is compatible with democratic constitutionalism and 
whether, if the state is religious, the particular religion respects democratic 
constitutionalism. As mentioned earlier, Bader maintains that the state should
24 These clauses refer to the first amendment of the Constitution of the United States which reads: 
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to 
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”
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aim for a "difference-sensitivity" as opposed to "difference blindness" and
should view "fairness as even-handedness". It should be emphasized that
ignoring the differences within a society does not make a state neutral in its
decision-making, but that a state should focus more on being acutely aware of
those differences and on making policy-decisions that would treat all fairly.
The guiding idea of even-handedness is that what fairness entails is a 
sensitive balancing of competing claims for recognition and support in 
matters of culture and identity. Instead of trying to abstract from 
particularity, we should embrace it, but in a way that is fair to all the 
different particularities. Now being fair does not mean that every cultural 
claim and identity will be given equal weight, but rather that each will be 
given appropriate weight under the circumstances and given a 
commitment to equal respect for all. History matters, numbers matter, the 
relative importance of the claim to those who present it matters, and so do 
many other considerations.^^
Firstly, Bader argues that separation does not guarantee equal treatment of
different faiths and in fact, secularism closes the doors on those of faith:
The secular mode is merely another point on the spectrum of religious 
expression, but one which has no understanding of and which makes no 
allowance for, other modes of religious expression... Just how do we 
organize ourselves so that the many voices can be heard, so that one 
dominant culture doesn't impose itself on us all?^^
Bader sees secularism as one voice among the many, and not the only road to
liberalism and democracy.
Bader argues that the state maintaining a secular morality is misleading,
as it assumes that all secular thought is compatible with democracy; a secular
state discriminates against religious supporters of liberal democracy; and it
25 Bader, 607.
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creates an 'us versus them' mentality and paints all followers of religion with the 
same bleak brush of anti-freedom and anti-tolerance. Instead, Bader advocates a 
"priority for democracy" since the truths of the secular, or the religious citizens, 
or any other voice, are merely the "truths [that] are no more than opinions 
among others"^®. In Bader's mind, as opposed to Audi, the only important 
ideology for the state is democracy, and any argument that is compatible with 
this, whether secular or religious, should be welcomed in the public sphere. 
Conversely, the state should not look for consensus but look for ways to live with 
differences, including religious differences, in the public sphere as well as 
disagreements, as that is the basis of democracy. Finally, Bader supports the 
notion that the dichotomy of separation and strong establishment should be 
expanded to include weak establishment, and constitutional pluralism, which 
institutionalizes pluralism in a formal manner. The relationship that Bader 
favours is non-constitutional pluralism. While Bader does not give descriptions 
of these three models for Church-state relations, it could be understood that 
weak establishment is a relationship in which religion is included within political 
dialogue and constitutional pluralism is a relationship in which pluralism of 
religion and ideas are formally written into the laws of the country. Non­
constitutional pluralism is the relation in which pluralism is not formalized by 
the constitution but is innate in the workings of society. In other words.
26 Bader, 608.
27 Bader, 609.
28 Bader, 614.
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pluralism takes the role of being a bottom-up philosophy as opposed to a top- 
down imposition.
While allowing more voices than Audi's, the problem with Bader's 
analysis is that he gives no basis for implementation of his ideology and 
acknowledges that the idea of implementing non-constitutional pluralism needs 
to be researched further. Who determines which religious beliefs are compatible 
with democracy? There are some who would argue that the Islamic faith is not 
conducive to equality for all, especially women. Perhaps Bader is only arguing 
for the political floor to be opened up to religious faith. Audi, I think, would 
argue that this would be a slippery slope into a strong Church-state relationship 
with the dominant faith that would ignore minority faiths and the secular. If 
Bader's argument is that each faction is weighted with "even-handedness", then 
does it not follow that a dominant faith (Protestantism among many countries in 
the West) will have the majority voice to implement policy, which may not be 
conducive to the freedom of all? A recent political debate within Canada comes 
to mind, that of same-sex marriage legislation. Many Christian groups, as well 
as others, vehemently oppose this legislation. How can religious opinions be 
taken into account if they disagree with secular policy? Can the state find the 
healthy balance between secular and strong religious establishment? And once 
found, can a balance be maintained?
The third model of Church-state relations to be discussed here is often 
ignored in Western literature. Symphonia, as discussed by Zoe Knox in "The
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Symphonie Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate's Post-Soviet Leadership", is at the 
opposite end of the spectrum from separation. Symphonia represents a strong 
link between Church and state and views the Church as the backbone to the 
ethical framework of a nation. In essence, the two institutions work "in concert" 
with each other. In order for the state to perform its duties properly, it must be 
in consultation with the Church and the Church must be part of the political 
sphere. Each body has influence over the other. This relationship grants 
privilege to one majority faith over other religions. This is not to say that there is 
persecution of other faiths: Pluralism may be nominally equal in theory; 
however, in practice, some are more equal than others. As in Bader's argument, 
history, numbers, and other considerations are given to each faith. When there is 
an establishment of a Church, where the state has a close relationship with one 
Church, what are the implications for the non-majority faiths? Where is the voice 
of the secular?
Symphonia emphasizes the importance of history and traditions. It also
gives society a sense of unity and identity, especially in public life. Symphonia
gives clear support to morality and ethics within public life and education
through the Church. It recognizes the importance of the Church in the formation
of nations and states and gives a conscience and accountability to the state and to
society. Bhiku Parekh notes that:
Religion provides a valuable counterweight to the state... Just as we need 
opposition parties to check the government of the day, we need powerful 
non-state institutions to check the statist manner of thinking, including the
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glorification of the state. If religion is prone to the vice of 
fundamentalism, the state is prone to the equally undesirable evil of 
nationalism.^^
However, symphonia also holds the danger of violating individual rights to 
freedom of conscience and does not appear to be conducive to religious 
pluralism. Further, symphonia often relies on the mythes of religion -  those ideas 
that give understanding and meaning to people's day-to-day lives, helping 
people focus on the eternal and universal. In most Western societies, people rely 
more on the logos -  the scientific reasoning and logic of understanding the world 
-  than mythos. Within the context of symphonia, the Church supports the state 
implementing social policies and public decision-making that coincides with 
religious virtues and ideology. However, the cost of this relationship is heavy. 
How do Church and state achieve symphonia without violating principles of 
individual rights and introducing excessive state influence on religious groups? 
Is a strong established Church-state relationship the best system for a diverse 
and pluralist society? At what point do boundaries get defined regarding 
Church influence on the state? Can there be an unbiased justice where there is 
such a strong influence of religion? Some would argue that a strong established 
Church-state might not even be the best thing for the Church.
The three positions outlined here can be seen as points on an arc linking 
political and religious sentiment. The strengths and weaknesses of each are
^ Bhiku Parekh "Religion and Public Life" in Church, State and Religious Minorities, (London: land: 
Policy Studies Institute, 1997), pp. 16-23. Quote on p. 21.
20
outlined in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Three models for Church-state relations
Morality Strengths Weaknesses Examples
Complete
Separation
(Secularism)
State Law
defines
morality
i) Little or no religious 
influence on state
ii) No state involvement 
in Church
iii) Supportive of 
religious pluralism
iv) Supportive of 
individual rights
i) Voice of 
religion 
excluded from 
public square.
ii) Limits moral 
actors.
iii) Ignores 
tradition
i) Soviet Union -  the 
philosophy of the state 
became the religion of 
Soviet society, leaving a 
void in the lives of 
people when that 
philosophy collapsed.
ii) Canada -  when 
controversial legislation 
is brought up for 
debate, such as the 
same-sex marriage 
legislation, religious 
voices are heard but 
individual rights come 
first.
Weak
Establishment
Religion has 
some influence 
over state law 
and morality
i) Supportive of 
religious pluralism
ii) No pronounced role 
for majority religion.
i) How to 
maintain 
equality 
between faiths?
ii) State
decision-making 
vulnerable to 
the religious 
beliefs of those 
holding office.
USA -  while the US was 
the first to 
constitutionalize 
secularism, it is in fact 
not a secular state. 
Those who hold office 
impart religious 
influence on the state. 
For example. President 
Bush is far more prone 
to use religious 
judgement in his office 
than was President 
Clinton.
Symphonia Religion
defines
morality
i) Focus on tradition
ii) Acknowledgement of 
role of religion in 
formation of society
iii) Provides unity and 
identity
i) Not
supportive of
religious
pluralism.
ii) Lesser role for 
secular voice.
iii) Increase in 
bureaucracy for 
state and 
Church
iii) State 
involvement in 
Church affairs
iv) Not 
supportive of 
individual right 
to choose.
Islam -  Within Muslim 
nations the Church and 
the state cannot be 
separated. State laws 
are based on religious 
texts and individual 
rights are not 
important. The five 
pillars of Islam: religion, 
life, intellect, offspring 
and property.
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The relationship between the Church and the state brings about intense political 
questions and tensions within established political systems. Imagine now the 
challenges of establishing Church-state relations during political transition. It is 
to that task that we now turn.
2 2
Chapter Two 
History
In order to comprehend contemporary challenges to Church-state 
relations in Russia, the historical context must be recognized. Contemporary 
politics do not exist within a vacuum but are shaped and defined by historical 
experience. In this chapter a large period of Russian history is covered. We 
begin with the onset of Kievan Rus's conversion to Christianity. Hugh Ragsdale 
suggests that Russia has been a country with a strong state, but a weak society 
because it has no tradition of public institutions, such as the Church, to inhibit 
the state.  ^ And yet the Orthodox Church in Russia has occasionally exercised 
significant political influence. This chapter will outline the fluctuations of 
Church-state relations, the varying factors that impact that relationship and the 
role of religion in society as it follows through one thousand years of Russian 
history.
The history of Church and state relations in Russia can be traced back to 
the conversion to the Greek variant of Christianity by Kievan Rus. In 988 AD, 
Prince Vladimir officially converted to Orthodox Christianity, then centred in 
Constantinople. His reasons for choosing Byzantium over Rome, and other 
faiths, including Judaism, were based on the wealth of Byzantium, the strong 
culture, the beauty of the Orthodox rituals and churches, and the importance of 
trade with the Byzantine Empire. Richard Pipes argues that this choice would
1 Hugh Ragsdale, The Russian Tragedy: The Burden of History (Armonk, N ew York: M.E. Sharpe, 
Inc., 1996 ), 33.
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set the course of Russian history.  ^ In essence, this choice was the first of many 
that isolated Russia from the West. From its origin, the Orthodox Church in 
Russia was decentralized, lacking in cohesion and unity as all of its authority 
came from Constantinople. Issues of conflict or disagreement were settled by 
synods, or councils of higher clergy, and the regional branches of the Orthodox 
Church used the local languages for liturgies and theological writings. Each 
branch had its own hierarchy in its own region, separating each diocese/ eparchy 
by geography and language.
The Byzantine influence on the Russian Orthodox Church was 
undeniable, especially in Church-state relations. The Byzantine heritage stressed 
a symbiotic relation between Church and state, reflected by the many deep roots 
in history and doctrine. In Byzantium, the Emperor was the defender of the 
Church, and conservatives strongly resisted changes to rituals and practice. 
These were features that became apparent in the Russian Orthodox Church. The 
foundation for Church-state relations in Russia was based on the Byzantine 
model.
The first clergy in Kievan Rus were from abroad and had influence over 
the princes because of their education and perceived sophistication. The later 
metropolita of Kiev and Russia were primarily without political influence, 
although these local metropolita were the only permanent force for Orthodoxy in 
the area at the time. After the death of Alexis Metropolitan of Kiev and All
2 Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1974), 224
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Russia in 1378, the metropolita of Russia were weak and divided while the grand 
prince had become strong. The metropolita divided itself into north and south, 
the centres being in Moscow and Kiev. ^
The authority of the metropolitan of Moscow became permanent when 
Constantinople fell to the Turks in 1453. At this time, there was little cormection 
between the nobility and the clergy, unlike in the West. Clergy, primarily from 
the population of Russia, were divided into the 'white' (married priests) and the 
'black' (monks). Only the black clergy, who lived with monasteries, were eligible 
for ascending the ranks of the Church hierarchy. Moscow's Grand Prince Vasily 
I made an agreement with Metropolitan Cyprian that those who served the 
Grand Prince were not eligible to enter the priesthood. This divided Church and 
state into distinct institutions that would work in harmony with each other. The 
clergy maintained their status through education, as they were among the 
minority of those within society that were educated. This status later declined as 
foreign teachers were brought in to secularize education by Peter the Great.^
Richard Pipes feels that the Golden Age of the Russian Orthodox Church 
was the time of the Mongol occupation of Russia, a 250 year period which began 
in 1237. During this time the clergy were exempt from the Mongol tribute faced
 ^The hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church is limited to members of the ‘black’ clergy and is as 
follows, starting with the lowest in authority: monk, monastic deacon, monastic priest, hegumen, 
archmandrite (which is essentially the same as a hegumen, but the head of a larger monastery), 
bishop, archbishop, metropolitan and patriarch. This hierarchy was described by Nathaniel Davis, A  
Long Walk to Church: A  Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy (USA: Westview Press, 2003), 
162.
* Sergei M. Soloviev, Tlte Character of Old Russia, (USA: Academic International Press, 1987).
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by the rest of Russian society. In exchange for prayers for the khan and his 
family, clergy did not have to pay taxes or tribute, they were able to have peasant 
workers for their land, and were allowed to be landowners. At this time the 
Orthodox Church owned an estimated third of the land in Russia. ^
The Church was well immersed in secular affairs during the 14* and 15* 
centuries, especially due to the massive landholdings that the monastic 'black' 
clergy had accumulated under the Mongol regime. This was a time of symphonia 
for the Church. However, by the end of the 15* century, there were stirrings of 
discontentment within the ranks of the Russian Orthodox Church. A movement 
of monks, the Trans-Volga Elders, led by Nil Sorskii (1433 -  1508) questioned the 
powerful position of the Church and its extensive landholdings and supported 
the power of the boyars. At this time. Tsar Ivan 111 was also looking towards the 
extensive landholdings of the Church and was somewhat supportive of the 
dissident monk movement, but was concerned regarding the Trans-Volga Elders' 
support of the boyars. Ivan 111 kept a close eye on the landholdings of the 
Church and on their money. In order to counter the growing criticisms of the 
Church, a movement led by Joseph Sanin (1439 -  1515), founder and hegumen of 
Volokolamsk made a move to support unlimited power for the monarchy.^ These 
domestic factors, coupled with the fall of Constantinople, were the impetus for
5 Pipes, 226 
 ^Ragsdale, Tragedy.
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the idea of Moscow as the Third Rome, which became a dominant political 
theory in M uscovy/
In 1448 the Russian Orthodox Church synod elected its own metropolitan. 
The previous metropolitan, Isidore, from Constantinople, had tried to place 
Orthodoxy under the Vatican and to merge Catholicism with Orthodoxy. The 
Russian metropolitan emphasized imperial rule under Orthodox principles and 
the importance of a long dynasty. Russian rulers became the universal Christian 
(Orthodox) sovereigns, and the Grand Prince was the Divine Authority. Vasili 
111, son of Ivan 111, was supported by the Josephists. Joseph Sanin "provided full 
justification for Tsarist absolutism and the subordination of Church to state"® due 
to his support for the ultimate supremacy of the monarchy. This support offered 
to the state was the first of many instances in which the Church gauged its 
political positioning with its own interests. By supporting this royal absolutism, 
the Russian Orthodox Church managed to save its properties, but also changed 
the tide towards an increasing reliance on the state and a voluntary subservience. 
This subservience had few political and economical costs as long as the state 
honoured and revered Orthodox interests. Yet symphonia required a director and 
the absolutism of the crown meant that the Tsar could assume that role.
 ^The collapse of Constantinople represented the potential collapse of Orthodoxy, as 
Constantinople was considered the Second Rome. In order to save Orthodoxy a new Rome 
would have to be named, hence Moscow became the Third Rome.
® David Mackenzie and Michael W. Curran, A  H istoiy of Russia, the Soviet Union, and Beyond, 4* 
Edition (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1993), 145.
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Thus, in the 16* century, the Tsars began to take more of a direct interest 
in the activities of the Church. The Tsar appointed bishops, decided who 
attended the synods, and interfered with Church justice. In 1521, for the first 
time in Russian history, Basil III removed a metropolitan for displeasing him and 
appropriated Church money. One of Joseph Sanin's disciples, among those who 
supported unlimited monarchical power, became metropolitan in 1522. By the 
end of the 16* century there was little left of the previous state of symphonia as 
the Church became subservient to the state.^
The death of Ivan IV (1533 -  1584), in 1584, left Russia without an heir. 
During the succession struggle that followed, Russia descended into the 'Times 
of Troubles', a breakdown of the state which led eventually to a renegotiation if 
Church-state relations. An ensuing Civil War began with three main parties: the 
Polish, the Cossacks, and the boyars. With no recognized heir the throne passed 
through a few different hands, most notably to the "pretender Tsar" Dmitry 1 
(1605 -  1606) in 1605. This Tsar surrounded himself with Poles and married in a 
Catholic ceremony. The disapproving boyars had had enough and a movement 
to liberate Russia was initiated by Prince Vasili Shuiskii, who had fingered 
Dmitry as an impostor, and an uprising quickly gathered momentum throughout 
Russia. After Dmitry I was murdered and a "fraudulent" boyar council (zemskii 
sahor) was convened, Shuiskii was enthroned as Vasili IV. However, there was a 
lack of support for this Tsar as well and a two-year civil war ensued. The Polish
® Pipes, 233.
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defeated Vasili in 1610 and by the end of the year there was no legal Muscovite 
government or Tsar. King Sigismund of Poland ruled over Russia as a dictator 
and had leaders of his opposition, including Filaret Romanov, imprisoned. It 
was the imprisoned Patriarch Germogen who appealed to Russians not to bow 
down but to unite. The centre of this uprising was in Nizhnii-Novgorod.^o The 
Polish were driven back and the Cossacks were hunted into the southern 
countryside. After Moscow was liberated, a Russian council elected seventeen- 
year-old Mikhail Romanov (Mikhail I 1613 -  1645) to be the new Tsar in 1613. 
This was the beginning of the Romanov dynasty, which would last for 300 years. 
At this time the power was still held somewhat in the hands of the Church, a 
position that became all too clear when the popular and powerful boyar Fyodor 
Romanov, Tsar Mikhail's father, became Patriarch Filaret. This marked a 
movement along the cycle back to a more symphonic Church-state relationship, 
although one in which the balance of power lay in the hands of Patriarch Filaret, 
Patriarch Filaret gave himself the title of Grand Sovereign, a title he 
shared with his Tsar son, who ruled from 1613 -  1645. Filaret essentially ruled 
the state and tried to pass reforms to re-establish Russia after the civil war. It 
was Filaret who approached the Boyar Duma on reforms and made major 
d e c i s i o n  o n  s t a t e  a f f a i r s .  F i l a r e t  h e l d  p o w e r  u n t i l  h i s  d e a t h  i n  1633. U p o n  t h e  
death of Tsar Mikhail, his son, Alexis took over the throne and ruled from 1645 
until 1676. Alexis sought counsel from both the Patriarchate and the Boyar
’ MacKenzie and Curran, 178 - 183.
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Duma. The "symphonic" relationship between Church and state reached its 
highest point at this time, although it was more of a relationship of Church 
control over state affairs. Alexis came under the influence of an abbot from a 
monastery, by the name of Nikon. Nikon had been a married priest of the white 
clergy. After ten years of service in Moscow he convinced his wife that she 
should become a nun, and he became a monk. Well educated but imperious, 
Nikon made quite an impression on Tsar Alexis, who brought Nikon to Moscow 
and sponsored his election to patriarch in 1652.ii Nikon only consented to accept 
the position when Tsar Alexis and everyone present promised "to obey him in all 
things like a chief, and shepherd, and father."i^ Patriarch Nikon was appointed 
by the Tsar as Grand Sovereign.
Patriarch Nikon believed that the patriarch and Tsar should rule Russia 
jointly, in symphony, and for a while, he succeeded in controlling the second 
Romanov Tsar, Alexis. Tsar Alexis entrusted the state to Nikon when he left for 
the Polish front in 1654. While the Tsar was busy with foreign affairs and war, 
Nikon tried to establish a theocratic-style authority. Nikon became hated and 
feared among clergy, boyars and even the Tsar's family. This discord was the 
beginning of a swing backwards towards a subservient Church to the state.
Nikon made the move towards reforming the Russian Orthodox Church, 
something that was considered heretical by some clergy. In his mind the Russian
S.F. Platonov, H istoiy of Russia (USA: The MacMillan Company, 1925), 182. 
12 Platonov, 182
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Orthodox Church had strayed too far from the Greek Orthodox Church, 
especially after the Church Council of 1551 when the Russian Orthodox Church 
was independent, and changes needed to be made in order to bring the Russian 
Orthodox Church back to its origins, a "restoration of purity". The reforms made 
concerned ritual but not doctrine. They initiated a division within the Church, 
alienating some of the most dedicated of followers, "his [Nikon's] opponents 
perceived them as the introduction of p e r v e r s i o n s . Those followers were led 
by Archbishop Avvakum. This division put the Church in a further state of 
dependence of the state as the Church became more unstable. Patriarch Nikon, 
however, still had the support of Tsar Alexis, a personal relationship that had 
put Church-state relations into a perceived balance. Politically, the state 
supported shifting the Russian Orthodox Church closer to that of the Greek 
Orthodox Church since it meant a shift closer to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. 
This move would aid in achieving Ukrainian support for the Tsar and get the 
Ukrainian clergy to shift their support from Constantinople to Moscow. 
Unfortunately, Patriarch Nikon's arrogance and habit of overstepping his 
boundaries alienated him not only from many clergy, but also from the boyars 
and, eventually, the Tsar. The boyars resented his interference in state affairs.^^ 
In 1658 Nikon quit Moscow for a self-imposed exile at a monastery. He had
Ragsdale, 43.
11 George Vernadsky, A History of Russia, (USA: Yale University Press, 1969), 131.
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asserted that while the Church and state were temporally equal, the Church was 
spiritually superiord^
At a synod in 1666, attended by the Patriarchs of Alexandria and Antioch, 
Nikon was officially deposed and it was ruled that the Tsar was the head of all, 
including the Church, except in matters of Church doctrine. However, the synod 
upheld Nikon's reforms. This move did not sit well with many of the loyal 
followers of the Russian Orthodox Church, and they refused to implement the 
reforms. An eventual schism arose between the followers of Nikon and the "Old 
Believers".
Old Believers did not recognize priests ordained after the reforms, a fact 
which they later had to reconsider as their older ranks started dying. Old 
Believers were strongly persecuted for about a century after the schism. The 
schism was a disaster for the Russian Orthodox Church as it decimated its 
numbers and, as mentioned, caused it to lose many of its most loyal followers. 
This period unveiled the discord in the symphony of Church-state relations. 
Nikon has been considered by some to have been a decimating blow to the 
Russian Orthodox Church: "After Nikon, Russia no longer had a Church: it had 
a religion of state. From there to state religion it required but one step. The state 
religion was instituted by that power which in 1917 succeeded the imperial".^^ 
Nikon had created a Church-state relationship such that the Church was making
Platonov, History of Russia.
16 Pierre Pascal, Avvakum et les débuts du raskol (Paris 1938), 574, as cited in Pipes, 239.
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decisions on state issues. The line between the two became blurred in that one 
could not tell where Tsar Alexis's authority ended and that of Patriarch Nikon 
began.
Even with this striking blow to its composition, however, the Russian 
Orthodox Church still managed to hold on to some institutional identity and 
autonomy.i^ But with the fall of Nikon in the eyes of the Tsar and the boyars, the 
Church was removed slowly from its role in influencing the state, which 
removed an obstacle for Western influence.^® James Billington suggests that "the 
first two-thirds of the 17* century were consumed by one last great effort of the 
Russian Orthodox Church to re-establish and extend its authority over all 
Russian life.''^^ It failed. Between 1700 and 1917 the Russian Orthodox Church 
slowly saw its influence in state affairs whittled away and the increasing use of 
the Church to fulfill state purposes. However, the Church was still a pillar of the 
state in that it was a representation of the faith of the people. The Church as an 
institution became increasingly at the mercy of the state agenda.
The principle of symphonia maintained its theoretical validity, even if it 
was not upheld in practice, until it was crushed by Peter the Great, who became 
Tsar in 1689. Peter differed greatly in opinion from those of the patriarch at the 
time, Adrian (1690-1700), who was strongly opposed to foreign influence. Peter
Pipes, Old Regime, 239.
1® V.O. Kliuchevsky, A  Course in Russian History: the 17"' Century (USA: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994) 
no page number and I don't have the book here....
1^  James Billington, The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture (New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1966), 58.
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disliked the Russian Orthodox Church, primarily for its anti-West sentiments. 
He wanted to put the Russian Orthodox Church in its place and remove its 
remaining privileges. Between 1700 and 1721 the administrative functions were 
entrusted to the metropolita, and a new patriarch was not elected. In 1701 the 
state took over administration of Church lands.^o Those lands became 
administered by the Secular Department of Monastic Affairs. All those living on 
Church lands (except clergy and their families) were subject to military service. 
The Church courts were limited and much of their authority was passed onto the 
secular c o u r t s . ^ i  In 1721 Peter released the Ecclesiastical Regulation charter which 
administered both the parish and monastic clergy operations. Clergy were told 
what they could and could not do as well as what they were required to do. The 
Church became the "bureaucratic constitution of the Russian Church."^ As well, 
in 1721, Peter abolished the Patriarchate, established in 1589, an office which had 
remained vacant since 1700, and replaced it with the Most Holy All-Ruling 
Synod, later to become known simply as the Holy Synod. Essentially, the 
Russian Orthodox Church, or at least the management of it, became a ministry of 
the state.
The Holy Synod replaced the patriarchate and assumed all powers of the 
p a t r i a r c h .  H o w e v e r ,  the S y n o d  h a d  n o  p o w e r s  i n  c i v i l  a f f a i r s  a n d  w a s  u n d e r  the 
control of the state. The head of this Synod was generally, at least in the 18*
20 Pipes, Old Regime, 240.
21 Platonov, 242-243.
22 Pipes, 241
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century, a military man appointed by the Tsar. This council was responsible for 
administering the Russian Orthodox Church. This was the official swallowing of 
the Church by the state.
All clergy opposed Peter's reforms, whether they were Old Believers or 
followers of Nikon. Ordained priests had to make an oath to the Tsar and inform 
on any denouncement of the Tsar, even if heard in confession. Clergy were also 
invited to collaborate with the police and became a form of ideological police 
themselves. Peter's modernization victimized the Church. Education, 
newspapers, clothing, and Peter's mandatory shaving of beards all had negative 
impacts on Church-society relations. Peter's reforms were not just an end to the 
status quo of Church-state relations, but also a secularization of society. ^
The stance of the Russian Orthodox Church during these times of 
extensive reformation was a position of silent submission. The Church no longer 
held a position of moral authority in enlightened Russian society .^^  That is not to 
say that faith was not strong in the populace: faith still mattered, but the Church 
as an institution had been pushed aside by the state, which no longer needed the 
Church.
By 1762, Peter III (1762) had ordered that all Russian Orthodox Church 
lands be incorporated into the state holdings and that the parish and 'black' 
(monastic) clergy were to be placed on government salary. Landless abbeys
Pipes, Old Regime, 241-2. 
24 Vernadsky, 179.
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were shut down since they generated no revenue, which decreased the numbers 
of monasteries by about 50%, and those left received no government funding. In 
the 1860s, lists of clergy were drawn up and those without active parishes were 
conscripted into the army or included into a tax-paying estate. The nineteenth 
century secured the position of the Russian Orthodox Church as an arm of the 
state: "denunciation of political dissidents was considered a regular part of a 
priest's obligations. "^ 5
The Church accorded little attention to secular issues, unless they were 
found to undermine religious faith and practice, such as s e r f d o m . 2 6  The state 
forbade the clergy to intercede on behalf of peasants during such conflicts and 
clergy were told to teach the serfs to be obedient to their masters. Although there 
are some cases of proactive involvement, for the most part, clergy did not get 
involved in conflict and tried to iterate in their sermons that both serf and master 
were responsible to each other.^^ There were several reasons why the clergy 
were silent against serfdom in Russia. Ecclesiastical censorship was enforced by 
the hierarchy within the Church and the ecumenical press could not be used for 
public writings. As well, there was little motivation to help the serfs as clergy 
came from a unique caste within society and had little experience in the lives of 
either the peasantry or the nobles. Clergy consisted of a separate social and
^ Pipes, 242
^ Gregory L. Freeze, "The Orthodox Church and Serfdom in Prereform Russia," in Gary M. 
Hamburg, ed.. Imperial Russian H istoiy 1 1700 -  1861. (USA: Garland Pubhshing, Inc., 1992), pp. 
461 - 488.
Freeze
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cultural composition unlike that of any other group in Russian society because 
they were their own independent caste. Further, the Church was, by this time, 
subservient to a very strong state along with a polarized society, putting the 
Church further into a position of instability if it took any position on serfdom.
The Russian Orthodox Church struggled during this time for support 
within Russian society. Societal perceptions of the Church and its clergy were 
that of a bloated class living on the backs of the peasantry. This perception was 
seen in much of the art of the 19* century. Two such examples are by paintings 
by Vasily Perov (1834 -  1882). In the first painting the clergy is presented as 
being drunk while the village celebrates Easter, while in the second painting the 
Church is seen as living a life of luxury and excess (see Figures 1 and 2 b e l o w ^ ^ ) .
28 Paintings by Vasily Perov found at http://w w w .abcgallery.eom /P/perov/perov.htm l. The 
first painting is entitled Easter Procession in a Village (1861) and is intended to depict the 
corruption of rural clergy. The second picture is entitled A  Meal in the Monastery (1865 -  1876) 
and shows the perceived opulence of the Church in the eyes of society.
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Figure 1: (Vasily Perov) Easter Procession in a Village (1861)
...............
the M onastePerov
Ë3
The Russian Orthodox Church had lost much of its support among the 
peasants during the schism, especially from those peasants who supported the 
Old Believers. There was also little support from the educated, an increasing
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segment of society, as the Russian Orthodox Church was considered to be anti­
intellectual. There was also little support from the elite, which was the 
consequence of a few different factors: first, Peter passed a law forbidding 
families of the elite to construct family parishes and to have family priests; 
second, the upper classes were given a western education, as opposed to a 
Church-based one; third, nobles were not permitted to join the clerical estate so 
most Russian clerics were commoners, similar to members of the "urban petty 
bourgeoisie." ^  That is not to say, however, that these segments of society did 
not turn to their faith when looking for guidance, but there was little support for 
the institution of the Russian Orthodox Church.
The choices for the Russian Orthodox Church seemed bleak, but the 
Church held strong in its belief in the principle of equality of church and state 
and the Church stood up for basic Christian values. As Pipes noted, however, 
despite the Church's eventual opposition to serfdom and the massacres of Ivan 
IV and Stalin, "no branch of Christianity has shown such callous indifference to 
social and political injustice. This perceived callousness, which seemed to be 
consistently held by the Russian Orthodox Church, created a "spiritual vacuum" 
which would be later filled by secular ideology.
In the 1830s, a movement arose among some Russian intellectuals which 
was known as Slavophilism. It arose out of a need for identity among a group of
29 Pipes, 245.
30 Pipes, 245.
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intellectuals who felt themselves caught between two worlds -  one world where
there was an increasing negative reaction to westernization of Russia, and
another where the state refused to adapt to modern times. Slavophiles rejected
the notion that the West offered all the answers to Russia's questions and felt that
Russians needed to look towards tradition in order to build a modern Russia.
They desired a Russian Enlightenment, a "development in Russian culture"
which would play a critical role in the universal enlightenment.^^ This was a
resurgence of the political ideology of Moscow as the Third Rome. The
inspiration for this tradition was founded in the idealization of the communal life
of the peasantry and in the Russian Orthodox faith. Slavophiles held that their
religious identity formed their national identity:
In having both a spiritual and a national character, the Russian 
Enlightenment, unlike the Western, was closely connected to the moral 
condition of both the individual and the people; in fact, it was the very life 
of the Russian soul.^^
Orthodoxy was to become the universal, basic Christianity. Peasants were
viewed, rather romantically, as having a glorified life carrying with it the concept
of narodnost, or the "spirit of the people", by which it was meant the "unspoiled
wisdom of the noble s a v a g e " . ^ ^  Slavophiles "sought the link between the
awakening culture of Russia and the classical a n t i q u i t y T h i s  link was found
31 Susanna Rabow-Edling, "The Political Significance of Cultural Nationalism: The Slavophiles 
and their Notion of a Russian Enlightenment" Nationalities Papers 32, no.2 0une 2004): 441-456.
32 Rabow-Edhng, 449.
33 Billington, Icon, 324.
34 BiUington Icon, 347.
40
among the life of the peasantry, who lived within the "organic religious 
community".35
During the 1860s Slavophilism morphed into a Pan-Slavic movement 
which was far more autocratic than the previous ideology. This movement was 
supported by the state as it called for a unification of Slavs under the leadership 
of Russia with three characteristics: Moscow as the centre, Russian as the 
language, and Orthodoxy as the faith.
During the late 19* century the cycle began to turn back favourably for 
the Church in its relationship to the state, especially as intellectuals spoke out 
about the social condition of Russia and its politics. One of these was Vladimir 
Solov'ev, son of the Russian historian Sergius Solov'ev and an opponent of 
Tolstoy, who argued for a free theocracy. His theory was that the Tsar could 
unite Christendom politically. Billington suggests that Solov'ev was responsible 
for the movement of intellectuals back to the Russian Orthodox Church during 
the late 19* and early 20* centuries. This movement was part of the reaction to 
the growing influence of the West on Russia. Orthodoxy still symbolized a 
sacred tradition of Russian identity.
In 1900 a Church council was brought together by members of the 
hierarchy to secure liberation from the state. The Church was aiming for a form 
of self-government it had not had since before Peter the Great. The Church was
35 Billington Icon, 374.
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also looking to re-establish the P a tria rch a te .N ich o la s  II feared bringing the 
council together as he feared the emancipation of the Church. Due to the Tsar's 
opposition, the Russian Orthodox Church did not have an opportunity to 
organize prior to the Revolution.^^ The abdication of the Tsar in February 1917, 
and a subsequent collapse of the state gave the Church a window of opportunity 
to pick itself up and dust itself off after being under the thumb of the state for 200 
years. This would not be the last time that the Church took advantage of an 
unstable state. The situation in 1917 is parallel to the dynamics experienced by 
the Church in 1991. In 1917 the first patriarch since 1721 was elected. It was a 
sign of some independence while the political waters around the Church were 
turbulent.38
The Revolution changed the climate surrounding the Church's existence. 
After the Revolution the Church was forced to develop in relation to a new 
state.39 As a Marxist, Lenin distrusted the Russian Orthodox Church and religion 
in general. He also saw the Russian Orthodox Church as the final symbol of Old 
Russia and knew the dangers of turning Orthodox believers into martyrs. To 
avoid the martyrdom of believers, Lenin would need to dispose of the Church in 
a subtle manner. In the future socialist utopia there would be no need for
3® Vernadsky, 260.
Michael Bourdeaux, Opium of the People: the Christian Religion in the USSR (Oxford: A.R. 
Mowbreay and Company Ltd., 1965), 43.
3® Nathaniel Davis, A  Long Walk to Church: A  Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy (USA: 
Westview Press, 2003).
Andrew Sorokowski, "Church and State 1917 -1964" in Candle in the Wind, eds. Eugene B. 
Shirley, Jr. and Michael Rowe, 21 -  64 (Washington, D.C. : Ethics and Fubhc Policy Center, 1989).
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consolation from the Church. Atheism was required for party membership and 
was promoted in order to weaken the authority of the Church.
Between 1917 and 1920 there was heavy persecution of clergy, who were 
shot or starved to death in prison. On January 23,1918 the tie between Church 
and state was completely severed when Church buildings were nationalized and 
Church services could only be held through contracts with local soviets. The July 
1918 constitution allowed for freedom of religious and non-religious 
propaganda, a sentiment that was carried in the constitution of 1923.^0 The 
practice of this freedom, however, was not recognized within the state 
enforcement of atheism.
Under the Bolsheviks, Church lands were nationalized, the Church lost 
all of its remaining judiciary power, there was a ban of state subsidies to 
churches. Church bank accounts were seized and there was a denial of legal 
standing to all church marriages, divorces and baptisms as well as a ban of 
organized religious education of the young. In 1922 there was a requisition of 
ritual objects in order to "break the power of the clergy"^^, or at least the 
perceived power the clergy had over the peasantry, as well as to aid in famine 
relief and a there was a series of more persecutions and executions of clergy. The 
Bolsheviks were on a mission to wipe out any remnant of the old regime, and the 
Church represented a consistent and conservative tradition of that regime. The
Vernadsky, 403.
Davis, Nathaniel, 3.
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Soviet government tried to instigate internal disorganization by supporting a 
group of Church dissidents that argued for radical changes to the Russian 
Orthodox Church. These dissidents became known as the "Living Church" and a 
legal council was created which described Patriarch Tikhon as a counter­
revolutionary. In 1923, upon release from prison, Tikhon gave Russian Orthodox 
Church support for the Soviet government. When Patriarch Tikhon died in 1925, 
Metropolitan Peter became the head of the Church, although not the patriarch, 
until he was imprisoned. ^  Metropolitan Sergei became head of the Church, but 
not as the patriarch, and in 1927 declared the Russian Orthodox Church loyal to 
the Soviet government:
We wish to be Orthodox and at the same time claim the Soviet Union as 
our civil motherland, the joys and successes of which are our joys and 
successes, the misfortunes of which are our misfortunes... Remaining 
Orthodox, we remember our duty to be citizens of the Union, "not from 
fear, but from conscience," as the Apostle has taught us (Romans 13:5).43
This assertion divided the Church into two groups, one of which, the Tikhonites,
felt Sergei was too soft on the Soviets and saw it as a rapprochement with the
anti-Christ. The Soviet government turned its support to the Church under
Sergei, and under his leadership, the Living Church was little more than a
puppet of the state.^
A f t e r  1 9 2 7 ,  t h e  s t a t e  i m p o s e d  a  b a n  o n  c h u r c h  c o n s t r u c t i o n  a n d  l i m i t s
were placed on Orthodox practices. The state-sponsored 'League of the Militant
^ Vernadsky, 403.
■43 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experience: Russia, The USSR, and the Successor States. (New  
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 189.
^  Billington, Icon, 521.
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Godless', founded in 1926, launched an aggressive atheist propaganda and anti- 
religious sentiment. By the late 1930s there was a third wave of Church closures 
and it is estimated that 80,000 clerics, monks and nuns were executed by the 
Bolsheviks, roughly half of the clergy p o p u l a t i o n . ^ ^
On the eve of the onset of World War II Stalin made a pact with Hitler in 
1939 and the USSR acquired much of Poland, Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia. 
Stalin's plan was to use the Russian Orthodox Church as an assimilation tool for 
these new members. This was a complete reversal of his previous policy to 
eradicate the Church and its clergy. Stalin met with Metropolita Sergi 
(Stagarodski), Aleksei (Simanski), and Nikolai (Yarushevich), the then current 
leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, at the Kremlin in 1941. The 
metropolita requested that the state allow the re-election of a patriarch, that 
theological courses may be offered to priests and that the Church be allowed to 
operate shops, candle factories, publish a monthly journal, open new churches, 
consecrate new bishops and ordain new priests. Stalin was very accommodating 
in all requests and also allowed for the establishment of seminaries and 
academies. 6^
There are three possible reasons for these allowances -  one being that the 
Germans were relaxed on the practice of Orthodoxy in the occupied territory and 
so Stalin also needed to relax in his persecution of Orthodox practitioners;
45 Davis, Nathaniel, 11. 
^ Davis, Derek, 17-18.
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secondly, Stalin was concerned about anti-Soviet sentiment among the Soviet 
people due to his harsh policies and implementation of his Five Year Plans; and 
finally, Stalin was thinking of foreign policy and the need for foreign aid, and the 
West had been critical of the religious policies of the Soviet Union up to that 
point. By 1942 there was a high desertion rate among Soviet soldiers and 
dissension among the ranks. Stalin appealed to tradition and he sought 
reconciliation with the Church in order to rally soldiers to fight for the 
fatherland. The appeal worked and the army was again strong with pride and 
nationalism. 47
Stalin was quite secure in his consolidation of power and felt he had the 
flexibility to make allowances to the Church. By this time, the Russian Orthodox 
Church was no threat to him. In 1943 the Patriarchate was re-established under 
state su p e r v is io n ^ *  and in 1945 the Church became a "legal entity"^^ and was able 
to lease, construct and purchase houses. A new patriarch, Alexis, was elected 
with a lot of ceremony. In 1943 the Soviet government also developed the 
'Council for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church' which was closely 
linked to the NKVD, the precursor to the KGB.^o At this time, there were three 
dominant faiths in the USSR: Orthodoxy, Islam and Roman Catholicism (in new 
territories only). The first head of this council was the former police official in 
charge of religious affairs and acquired the nickname of the Narkomopium, or 
Ibid.
^ MacKenzie and Curran, 693.
Davis, Nathaniel, 20.
Bourdeaux, 61-64.
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the 'people's commissar for opium'. The Church was used to implement 
government initiatives, including foreign policy, a move which enabled Moscow 
to exert more authority over the satellite Orthodox churches.^i
However, this "Golden Age" was not to last - it ended in 1948. In the last 5 
years of Stalin's life there was an increase in repression of the Russian Orthodox 
Church. It is estimated that at least 1,000 more churches were lost in this 
period.52 The Church had served its nationalistic purpose during the war and 
now it was back to 'business as usual'. Under Stalin's last years of rule. 
Orthodoxy was replaced with the religion of Leninism and Stalinist ritual and 
propaganda with a new ideological fervour. Priests and missionaries were 
replaced with:
soldiers of the cultural army, who departed from mass rallies for cultural 
relay races into the countryside to see who could win the most converts 
for communism and collectivization in the shortest possible time.53
Reasons for this last effort by Stalin to crush the Church may have been due to
his increased security in his position that came with the onset of the Cold War.
Stalin no longer needed to cater to the West or be concerned with their
disapproval of his policies regarding religion.
With the death of Stalin in 1953, a respite in religious policy was a
consequence of a leadership struggle that lasted until 1958. By that, it is meant
that Church numbers remained relatively stable. Once established in power.
Bourdeaux, 61-64.
52 Davis, Nathaniel, Long Walk
53 S. Afanasiev, "Cultural Movements of the Masses," Soviet Culture Bulletin 1931 July, 11-14, as 
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however, Khrushchev vowed that the last Christian would be shown on 
television in 1980. From 1958 until 1964 there was a new push of anti-religious 
policies, in fact, the strongest anti-religious policies that the Church had seen 
since Stalin's terrors of the 1930s54.
Khrushchev was a Soviet idealist, and believed that religion could be 
wiped out of society. Throughout his rule Church registrations decreased and 
Church buildings were demolished.^^ However, the Church still pursued a state 
sponsored role. In 1961 the Russian Orthodox Church joined the World Council 
of Churches, which the state used in order to influence the WCC opinion on 
world issues.56
During the Brezhnev era, 1964 to 1982, there were pressures on clergy to 
collaborate with the KGB and the Communist Party. There were no large scale 
Church closures, but still a steady decline. Church numbers, however, were not 
able to recover from Khrushchev's persecutions, and almost six thousand, or 
about 44%, of registered Orthodox communities were lost between 1958 and 
196657. 1966 Brezhnev put new policies in place that charged fines to
Churches that avoided registration, unauthorized meetings, and the organization 
of forbidden youth activities. These policies affected all faiths. In 1967 there was
54 Davis, Nathaniel, 33.
55 Davis, Nathaniel, 33-45.
55 Felix Corley, Religion in the Soviet Union: An Archival Reader. (New York: N ew  York University 
Press, 1996).
57 In order for a religious group to register between 1945 and into the 1990s, it had to apply to the 
town executive council, which then forwarded the papers to the district authorities, and then on to the 
oblast or constituent republic of ministers and republic commissioners of the Council for Religious 
Affairs, and then finally to the USSR Council of Religious Affairs for approval. Davis, Nathaniel, 42, 
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an increase in anti-religious propaganda, but also an increase in dissidents who 
were frustrated with the stagnation.
Between 1966 and 1986, the so called period of stagnation. Orthodox 
parishes only decreased by 10%.^ ® A growing concern for the Church, however, 
was the aging population of its followers. People who had been baptised prior to 
the Revolution were getting older and there was a real fear on the part of the 
Church that its followers would die out. The period of stagnation that took place 
under Brezhnev relied more on the natural dying off of the Russian Orthodox 
Church rather than the active suppression of it.
Of course, at this time, and during any time during the Soviet era, 
accurate numbers for followers would be hard to determine. The only ones that 
were open about their religiosity were typically elderly women who had nothing 
to lose -  no education to lose, no job to lose, no fear of persecution. This inability 
to openly express one's religiosity led to an unofficial privatization of religion in 
the Soviet Union, perhaps one of the few true steps taken during this era that led 
down the path to secularization. While the state continued during this time to 
maintain control over Church activities, society was inadvertently beginning its 
own separation of Church and state.
The 1980s brought a shift in ideology as atheists became less stringent and 
Mikhail Gorbachev took over the USSR in 1985. Gorbachev turned to the
58 Davis, Nathaniel, 55.
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Russian Orthodox Church to aid in his policy of perestroika.^^ He asked the 
Church to raise the level of morality within the Russian society and to aid in the 
control of alcoholism. At the same time however, Gorbachev also asked for 
more atheistic work, but did take a softer policy on religion.^o
The previous thousand years of history were tumultuous for Church-state 
relations. The ideal of symphonia never really existed. At each opportunity for 
such cooperation, either the state dominated the Church or the Church 
dominated the state. Perhaps the closest the relationship ever got to symphonia 
was under Grand Prince Vasiliy I and Metropolitan Cyprian in the fourteenth 
century. This relationship was maintained in relative peace up until Ivan the 
Terrible, when the state began taking more of an interest in Church assets and 
the rise of state power was less favourable for the Church. The Church was able 
to assert more influence during the 'Time of Troubles', moving the relationship 
back towards symphonia after the Church liberated Russia from the Catholic 
Poles. The supremacy of the Church was attempted under Patriarch Nikon, who 
placed himself into the seat of the absent Tsar. This usurpation resulted in the 
state reaction of forcing the Church back under its subjugation, a move that was 
brilliantly completed under Peter the Great. Peter the Great officially made the 
Church an extension of the bureaucracy of the state, a position it held until the 
collapse of Imperial Russia in 1917. Despite the religious revivals that took place
It was rumoured that Gorbachev had been baptised by his grandmother. 
^ Davis, Nathaniel, 63.
50
during the 19* century, the Church was never able to gain back the authority it 
had lost previously. Despite a brief admonition of independence while the state 
was weak in 1917, the Church became further subjugated by the state under the 
Bolsheviks. The Soviet era hosted a period of the Church surviving by the whim 
of the state, taking gifts when it could and waiting for the final blow that would 
collapse what was left of the Church's infrastructure.
Symphonia, for the most part, was an illusion for the Russian Orthodox 
Church and the state. For the last 300 years of Russian history, the Church was 
under the direct control of the state. This was the old relationship. The era of 
Gorbachev, however, brought about a new dawn for the Church. It seemed that 
the best was yet to come in the world of the Russian Orthodox Church, but 
Gorbachev had "taken off the lid of a seething cauldron"^! and only God knew 
what was next.
Michael Bourdeaux, "Religion Revives in all its Variety: Russia's Regions Today," Religion, State 
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Chapter Three 
Church-State Relations in Transition 1988 -1991
"For what you hold is, to speak somewhat plainly, a tyranny; to take it perhaps was 
wrong, hut to let it go is unsafe. " -  Pericles to Athenian empire^
By the late 1980s, Gorbachev and the Soviet state had adopted a softer 
position regarding the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as religion in general. 
The pendulum had begun to swing away from complete state domination and 
the Church was becoming a more important player in the rapidly changing 
politics of the Soviet Union. This chapter discusses the short period of perestroika 
and glasnost that would change the fate of the Soviet Union and the Russian 
Orthodox Church. As the state passed through this period of instability and 
eventual collapse, the Church also underwent change that closely linked it with 
the fate of the state and caused a myriad of internal struggles and strife. This 
chapter will outline how political, economic and social change led to a new, yet 
volatile, relationship between Church and state.
STATE TURMOIL AT THE END OF THE SOVIET PERIOD
By 1988, it was clear that any success in economic restructuring would 
require political and social reforms as well. This context is vital to understanding 
the rationale for renegotiating the relationship. The primary rationale for 
Gorbachev to develop a stronger relationship with the Russian Orthodox Church
1 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A  History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991. (New York The Free 
Press, 1994), 445.
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was a solicitation of societal support for his economic reforms. In 1988
Gorbachev met with Patriarch Pimen and five metropolita from the Holy Synod.
It was the first time that the Russian Orthodox Church had been received at the
Kremlin since Stalin met with Russian Orthodox leaders in 1943. Along with the
widening berth being given to religious groups, the motives for this meeting
were political in nature. Gorbachev was looking to the Russian Orthodox
Church for support of his programs and reforms. Gorbachev stated:
Not everything has been easy and simple in the sphere of Church-state 
relations. Religious organizations have been affected by the tragic 
developments that occurred in the period of the cult of personality. 
Mistakes made in relation to the Church and believers in the 1930s and 
subsequently are being rectified. ... Believers are Soviet people, workers, 
patriots, and they have the full right to express their convictions with 
dignity. Perestroika, democratization and glasnost concern them as well -  
in full measure, and without any restrictions. This is especially true of 
ethics and morals, a domain where universal norms and customs are so 
helpful for our common c a u s e . ^
The circumstances behind this statement set the stage for the 
establishment of different Church-state relations with the Soviet state. Never 
before had a communist leader outlined a 'common cause' with the Russian 
Orthodox Church. This meeting marked the end of state-imposed atheism.^ 
Gorbachev acknowledged the Russian Orthodox Church's patriotism and the 
Church's role in rallying the people during World War II as well as its constant 
fight for peace and its voice against nuclear destruction. Gorbachev made some 
concessions to the delegates, as Stalin had done 45 years earlier, urging the
2 Michael Bourdeaux, "Religion Revives in aU its Variety: Russia's Regions Today" Religion, State 
& Society, 28, no. 1 (2000): 9-21, quote on p.9.
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Church to commence with charitable work. Gorbachev made two promises: he 
authorized the official celebration of the Millennium of Russia's conversion to 
Orthodoxy in 1988; and he promised a new law regarding religion to  replace the 
law put in place by Stalin in 1929.
As promised by Gorbachev and in a true Church-state partnership, the 
Russian Orthodox Church marked the Millennium of Orthodoxy in the Bolshoi 
Theatre with the participation of the symphony and seminary choirs. The 
celebration was closed with a ringing of the church bells, which had been 
outlawed since 1961. It took Gorbachev two more years to draft a new law to 
fulfill his second promise.^ Another noteworthy event that took place that same 
year was the movement of the patriarch's seat from the Monastery of the Holy 
Trinity in Zagorsk, back to the Danilov Monastery in Moscow, which had been 
returned to the Church in 1983. Gorbachev was using his power wisely, and 
creating friendships within the hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church. By 
making concessions, he hoped to secure their support for his reforms. In June 
1989 the chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, Konstantin Kharchev, was 
removed from his office after the Holy Synod made complaints about him to the 
Supreme Soviet, the final straw in a series of complaints about Kharchev by 
members of both the state and the Church. During his tenure, which started in 
1984, Kharchev had made enemies in the Communist Party, the Soviet 
government, as well as the Church. Specifically, Kharchev was a proponent of
 ^Bourdeaux, "Religion Revives", 10.
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the multi-candidate patriarchal elections, which was not looked upon fondly by 
some of the leaders within the hierarchy, who wanted the election process to 
remain the way it had been. Church leaders saw Kharchev as an administrator 
who interfered in Church affairs. He had made enemies among members of the 
Communist Party through his support for the return of churches to believers and 
had spoken out against some local party bosses for persecuting local believers. 
He was opposed to, and tried to limit, the high involvement of the KGB in 
Church affairs. All involved had complaints against Kharchev. Yet the dismissal 
of Kharchev was considered a setback for Church reform.^ Kharchev seemed to 
be working to free the Church from being under the thumb of the Communist 
Party and the KGB. The supporters of Kharchev allied with him due to his ideas 
of Church reform but unfortunately, these ideas also made enemies among the 
more conservative of Church leaders and Party members. While the Church 
would have supported the removal of the Church from being under the watchful 
eye of the KGB, the more conservative members were opposed to internal 
reform. As for his supporters within the Church, Kharchev was seen as a means 
to an end. It had been hoped that his help would diminish interference from the 
KGB, the Communist Party, and the Soviet government. Without his leadership, 
the Council for Religious Affairs' role was also diminished, and was later 
abolished in December 1991. ^
5 Davis, Nathaniel, 73 -  74. 
 ^Davis, Nathaniel, 89.
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It was also during this period that more discussion took place regarding 
the Church's collaboration with the KGB. Kharchev, while still Chairman of the 
Council for Religious Affairs confirmed that the Russian Orthodox Church was 
under tight controls of the Central Committee of the Communist Party as well as 
the KGB. There were KGB agents within the Moscow Patriarchate's Department 
of External Affairs and many clergy were working as agents of either the 
Kremlin or the KGB. A former KGB agent, A. Shushpanov, had the job of 
working against the efforts of one dissident priest. Father Gleb Yakunin. He kept 
track of Yakunin's activities and led an operation against him, trying to set him 
up to commit espionage, a tactic that failed. Later, Shushpanov confessed his 
dealings to Yakunin and asked for forgiveness, which was granted.^
In March 1990 the All-Russian Council of Bishops formed a commission to 
look into the links of the Church with the KGB. All of the clergymen that were 
on the Commission were ordained after 1989 and hence, after the KGB screening 
era. The KGB and the Communist Party had previously wanted to ensure that 
those who climbed the ranks of the hierarchy were people who could be 
controlled.^ Four of the six permanent members of the Moscow Patriarchate 
Holy Synod were found later to be KGB agents: Patriarch Aleksii 11, Metropolitan 
luvenalii of Krutitsy, Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Metropolitan Filaret of
 ^John Dunlop, "The Russian Orthodox Church as an "Empire-Saving" Institution" in The Politics 
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Minsk. As well, the head of Patriarchate publishing. Metropolitan Pitirim of 
Volokolamsk, was also an agent. It should be understood that agents were more 
than informers, they were considered to be active operatives, for the Committee 
for State Security: "given the route by which these men became bishops, it seems 
more likely that they would be agents and defenders of a strong state first and 
Churchmen second".^ Yet, this seemingly unfitting relationship was actually of 
benefit for each party involved. The Church used the KGB information in 
developing their own domestic and foreign policy, which would more than 
likely be the same as the state, and the KGB kept well informed of the activities 
of clergy and society.
It was not only former collaboration with the KGB that the Church needed 
to concern itself with. Both the state and the Russian Orthodox Church needed 
to acknowledge the growing voice of Catholics in the Soviet Union. As well, and 
perhaps harder for Gorbachev to deal with, Ukrainian Greek-Catholics were 
demanding legal acknowledgement and a return of their churches and property. 
Gorbachev was pressured by Pope John Paul II into granting rights for Catholics 
in the USSR. In response, Gorbachev met with the Pope in Rome on December 1, 
1989, a meeting which Gorbachev hoped would bolster international acceptance 
of his domestic reforms. The strengthening of freedom of conscience would play 
well in the international arena. But the Pope was not going to give his "blessing" 
without some concessions. The Pope requested a legalization of the Ukrainian
 ^Dunlop, 30.
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Greek-Catholic Church and a return of churches seized in 1946. Gorbachev did 
legalize Ukrainian Greek-Catholic parishes, but made no commitment regarding 
the confiscated properties.io
RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH AND THE END OF THE SOVIET 
PERIOD
As the end of the 1980s approached, the Church was faced with a series of 
difficulties. This section will discuss those difficulties, namely: divisions within 
Orthodoxy; divisions in the Russian Orthodox Church between conservatives 
and reformers, complicated by leadership succession; politically motivated 
murders within the clergy; and the new law on freedom of conscience enacted in 
1990. The Russian Orthodox Church had three objectives in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s: the Church wanted state aid to better compete with its rivals, 
especially those of foreign origin; it wanted new legislation favouring 
"democratic centralism"; and it wanted the Russian Orthodox Church to be the 
only heir to the property of the pre-Revolutionary Church. Property became a 
key issue at this time for the Church, as the many schisms became apparent as 
the USSR faced its end. In Ukraine, a divided Orthodox Church and other 
religions vied for property. These divisions in Ukraine affected Soviet and 
foreign relations as well as the Russian Orthodox Church.
At the beginning of the Soviet era, as mentioned in the previous chapter, 
there was a division within the Church when some of its leaders gave support to
’ Davis, Nathaniel, 75-77.
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the Soviet government. One of the results of this was the formation of the 
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad as well as other groups who split, went 
underground, and opposed the acceptance of Sergi of the Communist regime. In 
May 1990 some of the disillusioned clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church 
started to turn to the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad. In the same month, the 
Russian Orthodox Church Abroad established its parishes in Russia the Free 
Russian Orthodox Church. It set up a parallel Church network and Russian 
Orthodox Church clerics were invited to join the "Free Russian Orthodox 
Church" through repentance for serving the Russian Orthodox Church and the 
Moscow Patriarchate. There would be no relations or negotiations with the 
Russian Orthodox Church until certain conditions were fulfilled:
1. The Russian Orthodox Church had to condemn Metropolitan Sergii's 
1927 Declaration of Loyalty to the Soviet State and its subsequent 
subordination of the Church to the atheistic communist government;
2. Its hierarchy and the whole clergy publicly repented for their 
collaboration with the atheistic and theomachistic state;
3. The Russian Orthodox Church exposed and carried out a purge of the 
most politically compromised members of the clergy;
4. It pulled out of all ecumenical bodies, primarily the World Council of 
Churches.ii
The Council of Bishops of the Russian Orthodox Church noted that dual 
Churches would hurt Orthodoxy and that by ignoring the Moscow Patriarchate
Dimitry V. Pospielovsky, "The Russian Orthodox Church in the Post Communist CIS" in The 
Politics of Religion in Russia and the News States of Eurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaux, 41 - 74 (USA, 
M.E. Sharpe, 1995), 46.
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as the legitimate local Church of Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad 
was excluding itself from the Orthodox family. 12
The second response pointed to the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad's 
collaboration with the Nazis; therefore they had no moral right to condemn the 
Russian Orthodox Church for collaboration with the communists. The final 
response came when Patriarch Aleksii made his address on the anniversary of 
the October Revolution. The patriarch took responsibility for the historical 
actions of the Russian Orthodox Church over the last 70 years. He explained that 
Sergii's statement in 1927 was only to save the Russian Orthodox Church from 
destruction. He admitted that there were two paths to be taken under the 
communist regime. First, there was that of the "Catacomb Christians", who were 
praised for their courage. Their path, however, was described as one of personal 
salvation through hiding from both the KGB and those who sought faith. The 
second path was taken by the Russian Orthodox Church, who made 
compromises to enable people to still have access to their Church. On 
Forgiveness Sunday (the last Sunday before Lent) the patriarch asked the 
forgiveness of his congregation.^^
The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was gaining popularity 
again after being persecuted throughout the Soviet period. A priest in Lithuania 
began the revival. The Church became official throughout the Ukraine on
Pospielovsky, 46. 
Pospielovsky, 47-48.
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October 22, 1989 when the Orthodox bishop of Zhitomir, Ioann proclaimed that 
the Church had been re-established. The Holy Synod in Moscow officially 
excommunicated Ioann. In January 1990, in western Ukraine a council of priests 
and laypersons met to declare their loyalty to the re-established order. Later that 
year, in June, a group of bishops, priests and laypersons met in Kiev to elect a 
new Patriarch. Metropolitan Mstyslav of Philadelphia was chosen, but since he 
was denied a Soviet visa. Bishop Ioann was elected Metropolitan and acting 
head. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church would later join with the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church in 1992.
The new feeling of freedom also brought internal divisions within the 
Russian Orthodox Church. These divisions became more evident in the 
leadership succession that followed the death of Patriarch Pimen in 1990. 
Metropolitan Filaret of Kiev was chosen as the interim head of the Church and 
June 6, 1990 was selected as the date for the election of a new patriarch. Many 
clergy were outraged by the swift pace of elections as the Synod was not going to 
wait the 40 days required after Pimen's death before calling the council together. 
The reasons for requesting a council and an election of new patriarch were based 
on the growing divisions within the Church, the possible exploitation of 
patriarchal candidates due to documentation left by Pimen, and especially, the 
fragile state of the Soviet Union. Aleksii was elected as patriarch, which further 
divided the Church as reformers felt he "carried the baggage of past Church-
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State c o lla b o ra tio n " .Father Gleb Yakunin predicted that "if one of the "people 
of the past" were elected, a Church schism would be in e v ita b le 'V ^
Patriarch Aleksii II first became known to the state in December 1985 
when, while still a Metropolitan, he sent a letter to Gorbachev. In the letter, 
Aleksii stated that the separation of Church and state does not mean the 
exclusion of Church from the public sphere and that the Russian Orthodox 
Church was linked to the country by "invisible threads"!^. Gorbachev passed 
this letter on to the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat, who believed that 
Aleksii represented clergy who wanted more influence, which was something 
that the Secretariat would find intolerable. By March 1986 Aleksii had been 
transferred from Moscow to Leningrad and he lost his position as the chancellor 
to the Moscow Patriarchate.^^ At this time, it was clear that Aleksii saw a moral 
and spiritual role for the Church, and that he thought that the Church should be 
independent from the state. After Aleksii became patriarch, his vision for the 
role of the Russian Orthodox Church changed little. In the early 1990s he did not 
support the establishment of a state Church unless 100% of the population were 
believers. Any less would result in a union between the Church and the state 
which would further result in the use of faith against those who were not 
Orthodox. There needed to be a full representation of the Orthodox Church 
within Russian society, "otherwise, nothing good comes out of symbiosis where
Davis, Nathaniel, 87.
15 Ibid.
15 Pospielovsky, 54.
17 Ibid.
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the Church begins to be used as a weapon: and when the Church is used as a 
club, it disintegrates into sawdust".^®
While Patriarch Aleksii was defining his vision. Father Gleb Yakunin, 
remained a vocal and dynamic liberal within the folds of the Russian Orthodox 
Church. He was also one of the most vocal political dissidents in the Church 
who openly criticized policies of the Moscow Patriarchate. He was particularly 
critical of some of the anti-Semitic tones of some members of the Church 
hierarchy. Father Yakunin also rallied for political changes in state structure and 
was active in political life. He spent from 1979 until 1987 in a labour camp for his 
views and became known as the "chief Democrat of the C h u r c h " .H i s  important 
role in Russian Orthodox Church will be discussed in further detail in the next 
chapter.
During the late Soviet period there were also murders among the 
Orthodox clergy in Russia. It is believed that at least two of these were 
politically based. The first occurred on September 9,1990 with the brutal murder 
of Archpriest Aleksandr Men while he was walking to church early in the 
morning. Men was born to a Jewish family but was raised an Orthodox 
Christian. He became a "prominent liberal theological force in Russian 
Orthodoxy, writing for publications of the Moscow Patriarchate and via
Pospielovsky, 48.
Zoe Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991 -  2001" Religion, State &
Society, 32, no. 2 (June 2004): 106.
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manuscripts smuggled a b r o a d "  .2 0  Men spoke out against the more conservative 
members of the Russian Orthodox clergy and commanded the ability to amass 
audiences in massive numbers to hear him speak .21 Under Brezhnev, Men was 
seen as a threat and underwent constant harassment, a confiscation of books and 
interrogation. He also spoke out against the anti-Semitism that was circulating 
through the more conservative circles of the Church. He quoted the 
Metropolitan Aleksii in "urging Orthodox faithful not to level fall into bigotry, 
intolerance and chauvinism" .22
Men's briefcase was stolen from the murder scene and the incident was 
followed by a very poor police investigation. Apparently, the day before 
someone submitted the license plate number of a car that had been following 
Men and a man was identified being seen near Men's home the day of the 
murder. The police did not follow-up. Some claim that the m urder was ordered 
by the KGB, others claim it was the hard-line conservatives that placed the order, 
while others claim that it was ordered by right-wing chauvinists.23 Davis cites 
James Billington, who stated that Men's m urder was "sanctioned at the KGB's 
highest level".24 Documents that were believed to have been in Men's stolen 
briefcase provided further links between the Church, Communist Party, Soviet
20 Davis, Nathaniel, 91.
Davis makes note of one talk he attended in which a stadium was filled with 15,000 people to hear 
Father Men speak. Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
Ibid.
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government and KGB leaders. Of note as well is that members of Pamyat^s had
visited Men earlier that summer.
Men's funeral was broadcast on the television program The Fifth Wheel in
which it was insinuated that Metropolitan luvenalii had arranged the murder,
even though luvenalii presided over the ceremony. Father Men's widow also
asked Metropolitan luvenalii to preside over Men's archives and written legacy.
Men represented a beacon of light for those aiming for reformation of the
Russian Orthodox Church and an example of how the Church can adapt to
modern times. A follower of Men's, as well as a religious affairs commentator,
Yakov .Krotov notes:
The real meaning of Fr. Aleksandr (Men) is his symbolic position in the 
mass media. Many of his parishioners, acquaintances, and readers still 
work as journalists. When they need to name someone as an exemplar of 
'good Christianity', they name Men. Who else? Yakunin is too politicized 
a figure and he is still alive; so he is not as good for a myth. The majority 
of the intelligentsia is peacefully minded, and Men carries quite a peaceful 
name: he didn't struggle with the Patriarchy and didn't collaborate with 
the KGB either. So his name symbolizes for the audience of mass media 
non-aggressive, non-politicized, non-silly, non-ghetto, non­
fundamentalist Russian O r t h o d o x y  .^ 6
^  Pamyat, meaning "memory" in Russian, was founded by Dmitrii Vasilev during the early 
Gorbachev period, became one of the first opposition parties in the USSR, and organized the first, 
large, unsanctioned public demonstration. It has been described as an "Orthodox monarchistic 
and national union of loyal citizens of Russian power. Its motto is "God, tsar, nation". Its goal is 
to restore the monarchy and the succession of autocratic power. It was a blatantly anti-Semitic 
group that believed in the "Elders of Zion" theory of a Jewish conspiracy to take over Russia. It 
is opposed to communism as weU as democracy. Members of Pamyat have been known to argue 
heatedly with other well-known Russian nationalists. During the early 1990s, the party began to 
lose pohtical clout and Dmitri Vasilev died in 1993. It is still active and maintains a website 
which can be found at www.pamvat.ru. Other information was found at 
www.hri.org/ new s/balkans/ rfer/2003/03-07-18.rferI.htmI#15.
26 Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 104.
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The other two murders occurred within five months of the murder of 
Men. Both men, who were also high profile clergymen, were tortured before 
they were murdered. The second to be murdered was Father Lazar, who was a 
member of the investigation team for the murder of Men. The third murder was 
of Father Serafim, a monastic priest who had recently re-opened a church in 
Moscow. His congregation was deeply divided, with one side including anti- 
Semitic sentiments of the Pamyat organization. To date, none of these murders 
have been solved.^^
It was during this turmoil within the Church that Gorbachev's promised 
new law emerged. The law "Freedom of Faiths", or the Soviet Law on Freedom 
of Conscience, was passed on October 1, 1990 and went above and beyond what 
was expected for religious freedom. All religions were equal under the law, and 
freedom of conscience for all was declared. The Soviet Union was described as a 
secular state; there would be no state religion or state intervention in Church 
affairs.28 The new law also ended the ban on religious education, ended the 
official funding of atheist propaganda, gave legal standing to all religious 
organizations, and, as mentioned, allowed churches to participate in religious 
instruction, charitable activities and publishing of literature. The law also 
allowed (and in fact the state encouraged) an influx of foreign missionaries into
Pospielovsky, 52.
28 Derek H. Davis, "The Russian Orthodox Church and the Future of Russia" Journal of Church 
and State, 44, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 659.
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Russia.29 The Russian Orthodox Church criticized the law, despite the fact it had 
a say in its content, but the law was an opportunity for Church-state separation, 
and perhaps even true religious pluralism, for the first time in Russia's history.
The problem facing the Soviet Union, or one of the many problems, was 
that it had no history of the practical application of religious freedom. There was 
no foundation on which this new law could be implemented. Previous Soviet 
officials who regulated religious activity found themselves with nothing to do. 
In 1989, less than 10% of the population was born before the October Revolution 
and hence, had no knowledge of much religiosity or freedom thereof. Zoe Knox 
points out, for example, that "the claim of Ioann Bellyustin, a nineteenth-century 
Orthodox priest, that Orthodox adherents did not have 'the remotest conception 
of anything spiritual' was not remedied by seventy years of religious 
persecution. "30 The Russian Orthodox Church had been state supported for 
centuries. By 1988, there were only about 6,800 parishes in the Soviet Union.oi 
As a result, many people did not even have access to a church. The role of 
Church changed during this time. It held some common ground with state 
ideology in regards to family, a strong and united Russia, the importance of 
tradition and a peaceful co-existence with nations and nationalities. The views 
held by the Church on liberal democracy, however, were not clear, and there was 
a definite anti-Western sentiment, such as its opposition to the opening of Russia
^ Missionaries were further encouraged with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. 
30 Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 93.
Davis, Nathaniel, 66.
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to foreign missionaries, in the Russian Orthodox Church's philosophy. But the 
Church maintained public confidence, at least for a while. It still held some 
influence and was the only foreseeable domestic alternative to Marxism- 
Leninism for the majority of the Russian populace.
As well, the Church was seen as the only surviving overt institution 
linking Russia's present with the past. In pre-revolutionary Russia, the Russian 
Orthodox Church had been almost synonymous with citizenship, and was more 
aligned with both the state and society than in many Western nations. While 
Soviet leaders spoke of a secular nation and the state pushed atheistic 
propaganda, the state still turned to the Church in times of crisis, once during 
World War 11, and again as the Soviet Union was crumbling. The partnership 
between Church and state as the USSR faced the end of the 1980s was one of "a 
coalition of believers and non-believers in a struggle to construct a society of 
societal justice, democracy and h u m a n is m . "32
The Russian Orthodox Church feared loss of its property with talk from 
those republics that were fighting for independence from the unstable Soviet 
Union. Two laws were also passed in 1990 regarding property rights for 
Churches. The first law gave religious organizations the right of land tenure, an 
important development given the historic subsistence (untenured) lifestyle of 
Churches, monasteries and convents. The second law gave all religious
32 Stephen White and Ian McAllister, "Orthodoxy and Political Behaviour in Post-communist 
Russia" Review of Religious Research, 41, no. 3 (2000); 362
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organizations the right to own buildings "essential for their activities". The state 
also abolished the requirement for priests to be approved by the Council for 
Religious Affairs before they could serve a parish.^s
In the early 1990s, many political groups were looking to the Russian 
Orthodox Church for support. Communist Party leader Ivan Polozkov went so 
far as to say that the Russian Orthodox Church was "a natural ally of the 
Communist Party in the struggle for moral value and against interethnic 
conflict".34 In April 1991 the "Souiz"^^ parliamentary fraction singled out the 
Russian clergy, along with the army, as one of two "eternal institutions of 
[Russian] statehood". 6^ Patriarch Aleksii adopted a view, named for the 
sentiments of Metropolitan Sergi in the 1920s, known as "Sergianstvo", which 
meant "the joys and sorrows of the [communist] Motherland were those of the 
Russian Church". Aleksii saw that the interests of the Church coincided with the 
interests of the state. That the reverse should also be true was silently expected.
In December 1990, Patriarch Aleksii signed the "Letter of the Fifty-Three" 
addressed to Gorbachev. The letter requested that Gorbachev "counter 
separatists, anti-state activity, incitement and inter-ethnic discord, employing for 
this purpose the law and the powers granted to [him]".^^ The letter continued to 
direct Gorbachev to rely on the Church and the Communist Party to re-establish
33 Davis, Nathaniel, 83.
34 Dunlop, 19.
35 "Soiuz" was the Union of Right Forces in parhament. The Russian word means "union" 
35 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
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order. Patriarch Aleksii's signature on that letter, which was published in the
Sovetskaia Rossiia, became a huge scandal that lasted from the end of 1990 until
August 1991.3  ^ On the anniversary of the October Revolution in 1990, Patriarch
Aleksii made the first moral -  political statement that had been made by the
Church since the 1920s. He stated that the anniversary should:
remind us that not a single political, cultural, or national idea is worth 
more than a hum an life ... Do not let the spirit of mutual hatred and 
vengeance once again celebrate its victory in Russia! ...Those who can, 
join me and the Church in the following prayer: O Lord, renew, protect 
and make wise our nation, for in 'distress it sought thee, it poured out a 
prayer when thy chastening was upon it.' (Isaiah 26:16).^^
Following the attempted hard-line coup in August 1991, the Patriarch issued a
statement in support of Gorbachev and appealed to the army to remain calm
under the c i r c u m s ta n c e s .H e  made the appeal to try to ensure that no lives
would be lost, hoping that the coup would come to a diplomatic end.
COLLAPSE OF THE SOVIET UNION
During the last year of the Soviet Union, Patriarch Aleksii appeared to be 
more politically vocal. He spoke out against the Gulf War, and on the increasing 
violence in the Baltic States. He also announced the Church's support for a "yes" 
vote to Gorbachev's referendum on renewing the Soviet multinational federation. 
As the end came closer for Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, however, Aleksii 
had less to say. Not everyone in the Church hierarchy supported the statement
38 Ibid.
39 Pospielovsky, 47.
48 Dunlop, 21.
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discussed earlier, which appealed to the army for peace. Metropolita Kirill of 
Smolensk, luvenalii of Krutitsy and Filaret of Kiev were among the most 
prominent who did not sign the statement. When the coup happened on August 
19, 1991, Aleksii held back his public voice, despite the request of Yeltsin to 
publicly condemn the coup, in order to avoid getting caught up in the political 
struggle. During his Church service that morning, the patriarch omitted his 
prayers for Gorbachev and for any other government. On the Tuesday, August 
20*, Yeltsin made a public appeal to Aleksii to speak out about the coup. Later 
that day the Patriarch finally spoke, "questioning the junta's legitimacy and 
calling for the restraint by the military, demanding that Gorbachev be allowed to 
address the people, and calling on the Supreme Soviet to take charge. Shortly 
after midnight he made a second appeal to armed civilians and soldiers not to 
commit the "grave sin" of fratricide and "bloody acts"".‘^ i
After the coup was defeated, Aleksii informed Parliament that he had 
opposed the coup but did not speak publicly sooner because some in the 
hierarchy disagreed with him. Davis suggests that Aleksii's purpose was to 
show solidarity:
the Synod tried to convince the public that it had remained united during 
the days of the August coup. The harder they tried, the more dubious this 
looked. One might suppose that the Synod members managed to 
convince the Patriarch that an open rupture within the Synod was fraught 
with highly undesirable consequences for him.^z
41 Davis, Nathaniel, 96.
42 Davis, Nathaniel, 95-96.
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Other priests were less hesitant to show their support for Yeltsin. Father Gleb
Yakunin called for a general strike and prayed for the defenders of the White
House. The coup leadership was opposed to glasnost, democracy, liberalization,
constitutionalism, self-determination and a market economy, as well as
preservation of the Soviet system:
the price of preserving the USSR had become repressions, the instrument 
that preserved czarist Russia so often over the centuries. The price of 
upholding the democratic path had become the fragmentation of the 
Soviet Union. Schism in the patriarch's Church would be an inevitable 
ultimate result of such a political d i s i n t e g r a t i o n . ^ ^
This ominous statement seemed to foreshadow those things that were to come 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991.
There were many struggles facing the Russian Orthodox Church at this 
time, especially regarding public perceptions. Firstly, the Russian Orthodox 
Church was facing the consequences of its support of, or passivity towards, the 
Soviet regime. The Church was seen by some as being an institution of the 
Soviet system, and so, was seen as a tool of that system. As well, the Church had 
become stagnant in a modernizing Russia and had not looked within itself to 
begin a process of internal change. Some citizens saw the Church as being in the 
way of modernization. Finally, the Church was openly anti-Western, at a time 
when Russians were lured by Western influence. Society was largely secular, the 
Russian Orthodox Church was losing its already tenuous position, there was an
^ Davis, Nathaniel, 96.
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influx of foreign missionaries, and the political system was in a process of
collapse.44
By the end of 1991 the Russian Orthodox Church was taking a far more 
conservative line than many Russians, including the state. This line seemed to 
become even more conservative as the 1990s continued. The Church's 
relationship with the state was also becoming increasingly more complicated. 
Research done by S.B. Filatov and D.E. Furman found that initially under 
Gorbachev there was a religious boom, but by 1990 and 1991 there was a 
weakening of sympathy for the Church due to the Church's right-wing stance, 
the revelations concerning the Church's collaboration with the KGB, and the 
seemingly anti-democratic view held by clergy.45 This shortage of sympathy was 
compounded by the number of extremist, nationalist groups that were aligning 
themselves with the Russian Orthodox Church as well as the anti-Semitic 
sentiments of some outspoken clergy members.
The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about a flurry of change as 
archives were opened, clergymen spoke more openly, republics gained 
independence, and the former Soviet Union was opened up to a barrage of 
Western ideologies. By the end of the Soviet Union the Russian Orthodox 
Church was a house divided within a union that was collapsing. The horizon 
was looking bleak indeed.
^ Dunlop, "Empire Saving"
^  Dunlop, 34-35.
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Chapter Four
Contemporary Church-State Relations in the Russian Federation
So far the discussion of Church-state relations in Russia has included a 
theoretical discussion as well as attention to the changes within the historical 
relationship. The collapse of the Soviet state forced an obvious renegotiation of 
Church-state relations. This chapter will look at the period after 1991, as a new 
relationship between the Church and state took shape. It is during this time that 
the Russian Orthodox Church played an important role in the re-articulation of a 
political ideology. The discussion here is divided into four sections: the state, 
Russian Orthodox Bishops' Council 2000, the Church, and finally. Church-state 
Relations.
In 1991 the Russian people suddenly found themselves without a political 
system. The reforms under Gorbachev had opened the floodgates and Russians 
had discovered the wonderful taste of a freedom that they had not known for 
generations. The lack of political system, however, left a void within society and 
people began to look elsewhere to fill that void -  to the East, to the West, to the 
market, and to the past. People needed a belief system to replace Marxism- 
Leninism, a belief system that was consistent with their own traditions. As it 
stood, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the purpose for society had been lost 
when the ideology that supported it collapsed. The Russian Orthodox Church,
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with its cultural and historical ties, hoped to fill that void for a large segment of 
the Russian Federation's population.
Stephen Shenfield has written about the four types of self-identification in 
the Russian political culture: the Neo-Soviet, which rejects the tsarist past and 
embraces the heritage of the Soviet Union; the Archaic, which accepts the Tsarist 
past and rejects that of the Soviet Union; the statist, which accepts both the tsarist 
and the Soviet pasts; and the Liberal, which rejects both.  ^ The Russian Orthodox 
Church tries to balance between the Archaic and the statist, trying to accept some 
aspects of the Soviet experience, while rejecting those that are not convenient to 
it. This is a challenging balance to achieve. Even though the Church was passive 
under Soviet rule, and at times even an active supporter of that state, the Russian 
Orthodox Church had been devastated by the policies of the Soviet Union.^ Yet 
the absence of a state and the emergence of a liberal-democratic construct 
encouraging pluralism seemed to be even more of a challenge to the Russian 
Orthodox Church. Thus, the Church argued that it needed to support the state 
and its policies in order to survive.
1 Stephen D. Shenfield, "Post-Soviet Russia in Search of Identity" in Russia's Future: Consolidation 
of Disintegration? ed. Douglas W. Blum, 5 - 1 6  (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994).
2 Nathaniel Davis notes that in 1939 there were approximately 14,300 churches and 8,300 priests 
after the assaults during the 1920s and 1930s. By 1989 those numbers had been depleted to 
approximately 7,000 churches and 6,000 priests (see page 143 in A  Long Walk to Church). 
Approximately 80% of the clergy had been killed during 1920s and of the 1,500 monasteries that 
existed prior to the Soviet state, only 12 were left before 1985.
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In 1991, 57% of Russian citizens identified as being Orthodox.  ^ Of those 
who identified as Orthodox, however, only 17% attended service on a weekly 
basis. 4 The collapse of the Soviet Union played a part in bringing society back to 
the Russian Orthodox Church, although the movement was more for cultural 
than spiritual reasons.^ To many Russians, the Russian Orthodox Church was a 
symbol of both Russia and the Russian nation. Despite internal divisions within 
the Church, the people viewed the Church as being united and strong. With 
nothing else to hold on to, society, and the state, chose to hold onto the Church, 
or at least a belief of what the Church represented.
The Yeltsin government welcomed the Church. It was felt that Church 
support would legitimize the new government as well as allow for a 
continuation of Russia as a world power, standing alongside the Russian 
Orthodox Church.
The emerging alliance between the Church and the state faced many 
challenges, three of which will be discussed here: legal, internal, and political. 
The legal challenges arose with the passing of the new Freedom of Conscience 
Law in 1990. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Russian Orthodox 
Church felt that the law was too liberal and did not outline enough special 
privileges for the 'traditional' religions of Russia. The Russian past and its 
traditions were counter to the Freedom of Conscience law passed in 1990 as well
3 Stephen White and Ian McAllister, "Orthodoxy and Political Behaviour in Postcommunist 
Russia" Review of Religious Research Vol 41, no. 3 (2000): 364 
 ^White and McAllister, 364 
5 Davis, Derek, 660.
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as the democratic principles that the new government hoped to put into place. 
The Russian state still had a long way to go before it reached the reality of those 
declared principles. This became clear as the state later supported the Russian 
Orthodox Church's request to limit the entry of foreign religions into Russia.
In the aftermath of the Millennium in 1988 there was a resurgence of 
Russians who identified as being Orthodox. By 1992, however, the confidence in 
the Russian Orthodox Church was beginning to wane. According to White and 
McAllister, the number of those who identified as Orthodox had dropped to 
43%.6 There was a distinction between religious belief and the Church, and a 
further distinction between Orthodoxy and the Russian Orthodox Church. The 
Church, and specifically the Russian Orthodox Church, was viewed more as an 
institution, unlike faith and Orthodoxy. People were supportive of faith and 
Orthodoxy, but not necessarily behind the Russian Orthodox Church as an 
institution. But despite some growing distrust in the Russian Orthodox Church, 
the Church held the benefit of being associated with the idea of what it was to be 
Russian. Even those who were not believers associated themselves with 
religion.^
The second challenge facing Church-state relations, as mentioned, was 
internal division between reformers and conservatives within Russian society. 
There was a growing distrust within the Russian Orthodox Church as rumours
 ^White & McAllister, 364.
 ^S.B. Filatov, "Religion and Politics in Mass Consciousness" Russian Social Science Review. Vol. 
34, no. 5 (Sept/Oct 1994): 23.
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of collaborations with the KGB and corruption within the patriarchate became 
more common. The greatest threat to Orthodoxy at this time, according to S.B. 
Filatov, was not other religions, but "Christians in a general sense".* Russians at 
this time were in a transitional phase with no clear worldview. More people 
believed in God, but they were not aligning themselves with any specific Church. 
Those who held their Orthodox beliefs the strongest tended to be less supportive 
of democracy and more supportive of a strong authority. Orthodox believers, on 
average, held a more structured worldview, which originated from the Russian 
Orthodox Church's resistance to modernization.^ The changes of belief patterns 
can be linked to the political movements at the time.
Finally, the relationship also faced political challenges. While the Church 
was quickly losing the gains of its recent revival there was an increase in the 
popularity of Western democratic values and an increase in undefined, 
unstructured religious consciousness. Filatov describes this sentiment of 
democracy as equalling ideological lustration, a belief in everything and nothing 
at the same time. The problem facing the ideology of democracy was that the 
ideology did not exist within the public sphere. Democracy is a process; it is the 
underlying currents for this process that make an ideology. The key tenets of an 
ideology conducive towards democracy -  liberalism and pluralism -  did not 
have a strong foundation in either the state or the Church in Russia.^^
® Filatov, 24-25. 
'Filatov, 28. 
Filatov, 30
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For Filatov, the problem with the former Soviet Union was that there was
no 'meta-narrative' for democracy. There was no foundation and no support for
democracy in the historical worldview of Russia. The void that people now
needed to be filled was no longer being filled by the Orthodox Church, but was
being filled instead, he argued, by "simple artless ideas" that were being drawn
from foreign movies,
It is difficult to develop democratic and constitutional discipline, stable 
organizational forms, and even a real dedication to democracy, given such 
a peculiar worldview underpinning...without any clear grounding in 
ideas without strong parties, without respect for the law, and with an 
astounding indifference toward what kind of constitution we live under 
and even in what sort of state.^^
In 1991 both the Church and the state were facing challenges to their previously
held worldviews which were complicated by the changing worldviews of society
with the opening up to the West. The traditionalism of the Church continued to
be a struggle for the Church and was the cause of the increasing alienation of
Church from society. However, while the Church itself was in isolation, it
represented something of a much stronger pull for people -  it represented a part
of what it was to be Russian. This was the pull that gave the Church some
leverage in its relationship with the state, which was grasping for legitimacy.
11 Ibid.
12 Filatov, 30-31.
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STATE IN TRANSITION
In 1991 the Russian Federation found itself in ruins -  an ill-fit image cobbled 
together from remnants of the puzzle of the former Soviet Union. The result was 
smaller pieces each trying to find their way on their own, without the bigger 
picture of the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation was no exception. While 
Gorbachev could see the power slipping from his hands, Yeltsin was working 
with his counterparts in the Ukraine and Belarus. The result of the broken pieces 
was a reality of chaos and uncertainty. What would happen next? Yeltsin was 
focussed primarily on economic reform and dissolving the Soviet Union rather 
than on strengthening (and/or reforming) political institutions.
Some would say that Yeltsin "led a revolution for ten y  e a r s " . The ten 
years under Yeltsin were certainly a turbulent ride: Shock Therapy in 1992, the 
October crisis in 1993, a new constitution and parliamentary elections, war with 
Chechnya and the currency collapse of 1998. There are two critical developments 
in Church-state relations that we will examine here.
October Crisis 1993
The early 1990s saw significant change in Russia, including the early optimism of 
economic reform and the growth of many liberties long denied under the Soviet 
Union. Yeltsin enjoyed the successes until the fall of 1993, when Vice-President
Janina Sleivyte, "Putin's Regime and Consolidation of the State" Baltic Defence Review, 12, no.2 
(2004):60
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Aleksandr Rutskoi led a parliamentary putsch to wrest the government from
Yeltsin's control. Rutskoi represented the right-wing faction of the government
and the coup resulted in an armed conflict involving the military. It was the
bloodiest action taken against the government since 1917. On one side of the
barricades was President Yeltsin, pulling for radical reform, and on the other,
parliament, which took a conservative line. Between these two extreme points of
view was a spectrum of political opinion. Yeltsin brought down the putsch in
October, and introduced a constitution to referendum in December.
Between 1991 and 1993 the Church had been quiet on its position and
which political agenda had its support. The Church wanted to wait and see what
happened and which political hopeful would come out ahead. The winner was
Yeltsin and his reforms.
The 1993 Russian Constitution, passed in December, contained two
articles that dealt directly with religion and the state. Article 14 states "1. The
Russian Federation is a secular state. No religion may be established in the
capacity of a state or mandatory [religion]. 2. Religious associations are separated
from the state and equal before the law.^^" one interpretation of these articles,
however, Nikolas Gvosdev states that:
I n  t h e  W e s t e r n  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  o f  t h e  t e r m ,  " s e c u l a r "  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a  
government or state favors no particular religion and thus tolerates all 
faiths. However, I  would argue that one can maintain that the term used 
in the Russian Constitution, "svetskoe gosudarstvo," and translated into
Nikolas K. Gvosdev, "Religious Freedom: Russian Constitutional Principles -  Historic and 
Contemporary" Brigham Young University Law Review, (2001): 514.
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English as "secular state" or "secular government," carries with it not the 
understanding of secular as religiously neutral" but rather the connotation 
of "temporal." That is to say, a "svetskoe gosudarstvo" is one where the 
state does not interfere in matters of the Church (e.g. government selection 
of hierarchs or determination of dogma) and concerns itself with 
temporal, earthly matters; this does not necessarily imply, however, that 
society as a whole is religiously n e u t r a l . ^ ^
Despite this constitutional foundation for the separation of Church and state, 
practice did not follow theory.
1997 Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations Law
On 26 September 1997 the Russian Duma passed a bill with 358 votes supporting 
and 6 votes opposing. The bill was the new Federal Act on Freedom of 
Conscience and Religious Associations which was to replace the law 
implemented in 1990. The law outlines what religions are considered 
"established" and identifies four traditional religions in Russia: Christianity, 
Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism. The law, however, through its support for those 
that have contributed to the culture and spirituality of Russia, could further be 
read to equate Christianity with the Russian Orthodox Church, making the 
Church an entity unto itself, and places other Christian confessions in limbo. 
Many groups were concerned with this bill, both inside Russia and 
internationally. "Non-established" religions, some of which being those new to 
Russia, were concerned as it favoured "established" religions, such as the
Gvosdev, 515 -  516.
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Russian Orthodox Church, over newcomers. The Kremlin argued that the bill 
was designed to "protect Russians from totalitarian cults and extremist 
g r o u p s " . H o w e v e r ,  among those groups that were not considered 
"established", there was a fear that the Russian Orthodox Church would use the 
law to thwart the actions of any Church they felt was a competition.
Another important point regarding the 1997 law, apart from being more 
limiting to new religions than the 1990 counterpart, is that it recognized the 
historical contribution to the nation made by the Russian Orthodox Church. The 
Russian Orthodox Church worked alongside the state in developing the bill, 
intending to limit the entry of new religions and to limit the activity of those 
"non-traditional" faiths. Even those within the Russian Orthodox Church were 
not given leave to criticize the bill. Those who commented on its denial of 
freedom of conscience, its violation of hum an rights, or the conflict with the 
Russian constitution were dismissed by the Church hierarchy.
While the 1990 law provided an opportunity for Church-state separation, 
the new law placed religion under the regulation of the state, or, as Derek Davis 
pointed out, a "perpetuation [of the] tyranny over r e l i g i o n " . T h e  preamble 
states;
Confirming the right of each to freedom of conscience and freedom of 
creed, and also to equality before the law regardless of his attitudes to 
religion and his convictions: basing itself on the fact that the Russian 
Federation is a secular state; recognising the special contribution of
i^Peter Ford, "Kremlin backs new bill to curb church activities in Russia" Christian Science 
Monitor, 89, Issue 208 (September 22,1997): 6.
Davis, Derek, 661.
83
Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and 
development of Russia's spirituality and culture. ...respecting 
Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism and other religions and creeds, 
which constitute an inseparable part of the historical heritage of Russia's 
peoples; considering it important to promote the achievement of mutual 
understanding, tolerance and respect in questions of freedom of 
conscience and freedom of creed; hereby adopts this law.^ ®
Within the law there are three tiers of privilege: one for the Russian 
Orthodox Church, which holds the majority of followers and has the ability to 
influence, a second tier for the other "established" religions (Judaism, Buddhism, 
Islam), and finally, the bottom tier for newcomers. The legislation denies newer 
Churches tax exemptions, it prohibits publications and the import or distribution 
of religious literature by these Churches, new Churches cannot organize 
educational activities for children, and there is a 15-year waiting period from 
registration before any new group achieves any legal rights.^^ In order to be 
considered a traditional or "established" religion in 1997 a Church must have 
been registered prior to 1982, which of course, under the freeze of Brezhnev, 
would have been nearly impossible. Therefore, many new Churches in Russia 
lost their standing and the rights granted under the 1990 law. In addition to not 
having tax exemptions or permission for the dissemination of material, non­
established Churches cannot own property, hire halls, or invite foreign guests, 
although this was not always followed in p r a c t i c e .
i^Quoted in Michael Bourdeaux, "Religion Revives in all its Varieties: Russia's Regions Today" 
Religion, State & Society, 28, no.l(2000); 10 -11.
Ford, 6.
^ Davis, Derek, 662.
84
Some of the pre-Revolutionary Churches even fell under the '15-year rule' 
because they were abolished under the Soviets and only resurfaced after 1990. 
The law has been implemented in ways that further undermined the pluralistic 
ideal of religious tolerance that many countries seek to achieve. Additionally, 
local governments take complaints regarding unpopular minority faiths to the 
local Russian Orthodox priest. This further substantiates the role of the Russian 
Orthodox Church by the side of the state.
Not all clergy supported this new law. Father Gleb Yakunin, for example, 
spoke out against legislation that was restrictive and felt that the new law fell 
short of its purpose, which was to limit the influx and impact of foreign religions, 
and return the Church back under the thumb of the state. Yakunin, along with 
others who were opposed to the legislation, "favoured an emphasis on 
ecumenism and interconfessional dialogue"^! something that they felt was 
eliminated by the law in 1997.22
It would seem that given these restrictions present in the 1997 law, which 
were absent in the 1990 law, that Russia was not ready for the freedom of 
conscience established in the 1990 version. The 1997 law was a step away from 
religious pluralism in Russia and a step in the direction of the Russian Orthodox 
Church becoming a state Church, or at least a state-favoured Church, in the 
Russian Federation.
Zoe Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges to the Moscow Patriarchate, 1991-2001" Religion, State & 
Society, 32, no. 2 (2004): 107 
22 Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges", 107.
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Winds of Change Blow Again
By the late 1990s, Russia was starting to pull back within itself. The promises of 
the West proved to give fewer results than was hoped, positive change was not 
as quick as initially thought and Russian society was becoming disillusioned 
with the dreams of the early 1990s. This shift was due to many different 
struggles that were faced by Russia, many of which were carried on the back of 
society.
Russian sentiment towards the West, and particularly the U.S., was 
starting to swing back towards the negative. This swing had been because of the 
poor returns of market reform, or it may have begun in 1994 with Russia's 
involvement with NATO in the Balkans. In February 1994 the Russian 
government "unilaterally countered a NATO ultimatum to Serbia, to withdraw 
heavy artillery units from around Sarajevo or face heavy bombing, with a 
guarantee to be enforced by Russian peacekeeping units on the spot" .^ 3 The 
result of this stand was the formation of the Contact Group in April 1994 which 
consisted of Russia, the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and later, Italy. Russia's 
involvement in this group was important as it ensured that Russia would be a 
part of decisions made. Russia wanted to ensure that there was a voice at the 
table for Serbians and that the Muslims and Croatians were not treated and 
portrayed as innocent victims under the thumb of the domineering Serbians. A
Allen C. Lynch, "The Realism of Russia's Foreign Pohcy" Europe-Asia Studies, 53, no. 1 (2001): 
14.
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voice for Serbians was especially a concern for the Russian state as Serbians were 
part of the Orthodox tradition, whereas Croatians were Catholic. The position 
that Russia took in this matter caused the state to perform quite a balancing act 
between appeasing the West and serving interests at home. However, when 
NATO began its bombing campaign after a Serbian bombing of a marketplace in 
August 1995, Russia was relegated to the sidelines to quietly criticize and 
comment. Russia participated with the Contact Group until NATO began 
bombing Serbia in March 1999.^4
In August 1998 Russia was hit with a decimating collapse of its economy. 
The collapse was caused by Russia defaulting on its loan obligations to its foreign 
debtors and by the earlier crisis in emerging markets in Asia. The government 
deployed emergency measures to prevent a complete disaster, but those 
measures did little to prevent the crisis. The next day the value of the rouble 
plummeted, prices for goods increased dramatically, banks closed, and the stock 
exchange became non-existent. All Russians felt the collapse, and many felt that 
it was caused by an imperfect Western system of capitalism and the market 
economy -  a system that did not seem compatible with a Russia way of life. The 
response of Yeltsin was to fire then Prime Minister Sergei Kirienko and put in 
place a new government headed by Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov.
‘Ibid., 16-17.
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Unfortunately, that government had no more luck than the other at preventing 
Russia's economic crash.25
Such developments led the Russian public to question and criticize 
Russia's relationship with the West. Terms such as "aggression, barbaric, 
undisguised genocide, criminal, Natocolonialism" 26 were used regularly by 
Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov, and Russian nationalism gained public support. 
The increase in anti-Western sentiment was certainly of benefit to the Russian 
Orthodox Church as the Moscow Patriarchate continued to toe the traditionalist 
line. Not only was Russian society becoming increasingly anti-West, but the 
state was also.
In December 1999 Yeltsin announced his resignation from the presidency 
and Vladimir Putin became the acting president. In January 2000 Putin enjoyed 
popularity among the people which he capitalized on in the election in March. 
At that time Putin became the next president of the Russian Federation.
WITHIN THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
I f  one had to describe the spiritual condition of Russia in one word, that word would he 
"schism", a deep inner schism of Russian society, one tlmt pierces every Russian loho Iws
lost his identity.
- Veniamin Novik, Orthodox Priest, 1 9 9 1 2 /
-^Michael McFaul, "The Perils of a Protracted Transition" Journal of Democracy Vol. 10, no. 2 
(1999): 4-18.
^ Lynch, 19.
Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 101.
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By 1992 the Church had affirmed that it did not support the idea of a state 
Church and believed that the best relationship for the Church and the state was 
one of 'free co-operation'. The destinies of the two were different, and mutual 
assistance -  without pressure on one another, without replacing one another, 
without red tape, without attempts to limit the freedom of the Church, the state, 
society, or the individual,"^® was an equitable agreement. The Church supported 
only those initiatives of Yeltsin that furthered the interests of the Church.
The Russian Orthodox Church had in fact become more politically 
conservative and insular since 1991. The Church was failing to reach many 
Russian youth who were ready to enter the new Western-influenced modern age. 
Alexander Agadjanian notes that the Russian Orthodox Church was going 
through a period of "institutional self-isolation" with the dominant strategy of 
the Church to be the "protection of traditional identity tlirough resistance to 
global liberal secularism," which included insulating itself from some external 
(outside of Russia) influences. ^  As well, the alliance of the Church with more 
right-wing groups put it out of touch with Russians. Specifically, the perceived 
fear of the Church of ideas outside of itself and especially, outside of Russia, put 
the Church out of touch with youth. As Dunlop described, "The conjoining of 
sergianstvo (servitude to the state) and iosiflianstvo (an excessive emphasis on 
externals, external to the Church) would ineluctably serve to discredit the
W sevolod Chaplin, "The Church and Politics in Contemporary Russia" in The Politics of Religion 
in Russia and the News States of Eurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaux, 95 -112  (USA, M.E. Sharpe, 
1995):108.
29 Agadjanian, 334, 339.
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Church in the eyes of the p o p u l a c e / ' ^ o  When the Soviet Union collapsed the 
people lost sympathy for the Church, especially as rumours circulated about 
collaboration with the KGB.
In late 1991 and into 1992, in response to the August 1991 putsch, the KGB 
archives were temporarily opened and the Supreme Soviet Commission to 
Investigate the Causes and Circumstances of the August 1991 Putsch was 
organized. A special section of the Commission, led by Lev Ponomarev and 
Father Gleb Yakunin, was set to look specifically at the use of Churchmen in 
KGB investigations.
The special committee believed that the KGB used all religions similarly, 
but the investigation was closed by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Ruslan 
Khasbulatov. Father Yakunin argued that their inability to continue their study 
of the files was not beneficial for the Russia Orthodox Church. The research 
conducted focussed only on the Russian Orthodox Church and would lead one 
to think that no other faith had collaborated with the KGB. Father Yakunin went 
on to state that the reports did not say what the various agents did and there was 
suspicion by those investigating the files that, since the investigators were not 
able to look freely, certain files were given to them and may have been selected 
to specifically discredit the Church.
3°John Dunlop, "The Russian Orthodox Church as an "Empire-Saving" Institution in Tlie Politics of 
Religion in Russia and the Neius States of Eurasia, ed. Michael Bourdeaux, 15 - 40 (USA, M.E. 
Sharpe, 1995): 35.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, four of the six permanent members
of the Moscow Patriarchate Holy Synod were named as active KGB agents:
Patriarch Aleksii II, Metropolitan luvenalii of Krutitsy, Metropolitan Kirill of
Smolensk and Metropolitan Filaret of Minsk. In February 1992 Father Gleb
Yakunin was publicly attacked in Pravda for figuring out the agents' names and
"defacto revealing names of a g e n t s " . I n  June 1992, in a closed session of the
Russian Supreme Soviet, Viktor Barannikov, chairman of the Russian Ministry
for State Security accused Father Yakunin and Lev Ponomarev of treason. On
July 26, legal action was taken against the duo by the Russian Procurator's office.
Theses charges were later reversed in December and Father Yakunin and
Ponomarev were not put on trial. However, the damage to the Church had
already been done. (The Church had been so infiltrated by the KGB that some
jokingly referred to the Moscow Patriarchate as the Mitropolitbiuro
(metropolitan/  Politburo) Zoia Krakhmal'nikova, a religious rights activist and
former political prisoner stated:
It is a catastrophe. A national moral catastrophe... This is a spiritual 
Chernobyl, an infection with the sin of Judas. The Lord said concerning 
Christians that they are the salt of the earth, the light of the world. And if 
we Christians behave ourselves so shamefully, so immorally that our 
clergymen collaborate with the secret police, that our hierarchs turn out to 
be agents of the KGB, then what can we expect from our people, of whom 
we are a part?... [A] patriarch who has turned out to be a KGB agent 
cannot repent only before Cod. He must repent [publicly] before the 
Church people.33
Pravda, 14 February, 1992, p. 6 as quoted in Dunlop, 30.
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32 Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 102.
33 Dunlop, 31-32.
Patriarch Aleksii did in fact kneel down before his congregation and ask not only
forgiveness of his sins, but for those of the Russian Orthodox Church under the
Soviet Union. However, some clergymen felt that it was not enough to repent;
Father Yakunin sent an open letter to the patriarch:
Is it not time for all archbishops and priests who cooperated with the 
secret police to reveal to the people of the Church the truth about our 
Church's tragic history, and to put it to that same Church to judge 
whether it has any further use for hierarchs who are CPSU and KGB 
collaborators, or whether the time has finally come for them to step down 
and for the people of the Church to exercise their right to choose their own 
pastors freely
Yet Patriarch Aleksii wanted to reassert hierarchical authority over the
Church. In mid -  1992, he made a statement asserting the position of the Russian
Orthodox Church in regards to the split of the Soviet Union and how it should
pertain to the Church:
The canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate includes not only 
Russia, but Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the countries of the Baltic, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia. It would be wrong 
automatically to transfer the causes for the division of the USSR to the 
Church sphere. One cannot form fifteen local Orthodox Churches in a 
country that has been divided into fifteen sovereign states.^s
It was thought by those whom Stephen Shenfield labelled as the 'neo-Soviets',
that if the Church was able to maintain its influence throughout the territory of
the former Soviet Union, then there was still hope in rebuilding the USSR.^^
By the end of 1992 right-wing groups were gaining popularity as the
"democratic" reforms put more burdens on Russians, and the corruption within
34 Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 103.
33 Dunlop, 21.
Dunlop, 21.
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the government added to their disillusionment. On the other side, the media, 
which was primarily controlled by Westernists, was highly critical of the Russian 
Orthodox Church. There was a fear among Westernists of a renewal of the 
traditionally close relationship between Church and state and Westernists 
therefore, emphasized the past corroboration of the Church with the KGB. Most 
of the media preferred the splinter groups of the Orthodox Church, Catholics, 
and Protestant movements. They saw Western Churches as levers for democracy 
and social welfare. By this time the Free Russian Orthodox Church (the Russian 
Orthodox Church Abroad in Russia) was moving towards allying with Vasil'ev's 
Pamyat and used Pamyat's "thugs" to get Churches from the Moscow 
Patriarchate. The Free Russian Orthodox Church later lost support among 
democrats, especially after siding with the "Red-Browns".^^
Some of the more conservative groups within Russia were beginning to 
align themselves with the Russian Orthodox Church. One of these groups was 
the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods, described by Pospielovsky as a neo-Nazi 
organization that campaigned against the best-educated clergy, accusing them of 
disseminating Judaic ideology. The list of the accused drawn by the Brotherhood 
differentiated in age, pro/anti-W est sentiment, and liberal/conservative political 
views. The only things these particular clergy had in common were that they 
were all high profile, popular clergy who were successful in their ministry and 
missionary achievements. The reputed leader of the clergy group singled out by
37 Dunlop, 32.
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the Brotherhood was Father Aleksandr Men, who had been murdered in 1990.3®
John Dunlop identifies a possible affiliation between Deacon Andrei Kuraev,
former associate of Patriarch Aleksii, and the Brotherhood:
The nationalistic ideology of the Union of Brotherhoods had come to 
dominate the ecclesiastical life of the capital. Kuraev defined that ideology 
as revolving around two obsessive themes: the imminence of the Anti- 
Christ and the greatness of Russia. A hunt for heretics was said to be 
another key aspect of the ideology.®^
The Church itself argued that it did not support nationalism, but patriotism, and
that it was not allied with any nationalist movement. But despite these
assertions, the Church still relied strongly on its ties to culture to claim the hearts
of Russians and defend a preferential position alongside the state.
The year of 1993 brought about many changes for Russia. Within the
Church, it was also the year that ultra-conservative rightists within the group
became more vocal. One such orator was Metropolitan Ioann of Petersburg and
Ladoga, who was also a permanent member of the Moscow Patriarchate Holy
Synod. Ioann was openly anti-Semitic, a sentiment that was believed to have
influenced his followers, and argued on the believed Jewish conspiracy of the
"Elders of Zion." He played on the increase in anti-Western sentiments, touted
the United States as a source of world evil, and promoted hatred against the U.S.
As well, Ioann labelled President Yeltsin and the other pro-democrats of Russia
as another point of world evil, and he encouraged followers to vote against
^ Pospielovsky, 52.
35 Dunlop, 34-5.
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Yeltsin and his social and economic policies during the April 1993 referendum, 
which was part of the showdown between Yeltsin and Parliament. The Patriarch 
remained neutral during this re feren d u m .^ o
Within the Church, there was a call from liberal voices who wanted the 
extremists removed from leadership positions and an official condemnation from 
the Church of Metropolitan Ioann and the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods. The 
Church, however, remained relatively silent, even after Metropolitan Ioann 
claimed the Patriarch agreed with his arguments of anti-Semitism and ultra­
conservative ideas. This silence would be maintained for over a year.
Despite conservative movements gaining ground within the Church, the 
Church was trying to make some changes. The year 1992 saw open dialogue at 
the general Council of Bishops. Discussion was held on the internal strife of the 
Church, including a critique of the bishops and some Church policies. The 
Church and the Patriarch, however, refrained from speaking out against ultra­
conservative voices from within the Church -  namely. Metropolitan Ioann and 
the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods.^^ This could have been a continuation of 
Patriarch Aleksii's need to show the world outside that the Church was a solid 
unit without any divisions of ideology or belief. However, the silence in these 
matters did nothing to boost the public's perception of the Church as a modern
Dunlop, 33. 
Dunlop, 35.
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institution, especially as the Church spoke out about more conservative state 
policies regarding freedom of conscience.
The Church's affiliation with non-Western and non-liberal ideas surfaced 
again and again. In August 1993, for example. Archbishop Viacheslav Polosin, 
chairman of the Committee on Freedom of Conscience of the Russian Supreme 
Soviet started discussions regarding his hopes for a "Eurasian Orthodox-Muslim 
Union" that would supersede the Russian Federation. In an article in the 
newspaper Nezavisimaia Gazeta an expert, Vladlen Sirotken, for the Committee on 
Freedom of Conscience of the Russian Supreme Soviet, (which was chaired by 
Archpriest Viacheslav Polosin) discussed this idea. It was based on the writings 
of Sirotkin, who had based his writings on the ideas of the "interwar émigré 
known as the Eurasians" who believed that Russia should be named "Eurasia" 
because it was so separate from other cultures and had ties to the nineteenth 
century idea of a "Turanian" East, as well as to other S l a v s . T h e  "Eurasians" 
were opposed to Western democracy, and supported instead an authoritarian 
rule, "the Eurasians believed that Russians were constitutionally incapable of 
participating in Western c u l t u r e " a n d  considered themselves the "empire- 
savers" of Russia. The plan outlined by Sirotkin was not just to rebuild the USSR 
but also to rebuild Byzantium. He believed that the people would rally around 
the plan if put forward by the Russian Orthodox and Muslim clergy:
Dunlop, 17. 
Dunlop, 17.
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If anyone is still respected it is the Church clergy... And, after all, the 
hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church have had the political 
experience -  both positive and negative -  of direct participation in mass 
socioreligious movements.^^
On 26-29 May 1993 the 1®* All-World Russian Assembly took place at the 
Danilov Monastery in Moscow. The Assembly was a collection of conservative, 
nationalist organizations; the Moscow Patriarchate played a dominant role. The 
Assembly was addressed and given a blessing by Patriarch Aleksii and some felt 
that "the Assembly was not only sanctified by the presence of the Patriarch of All 
Russias, Aleksii 11, but it conducted its work under the protection of the 
Church".45 The Church gave its response through Metropolitan Kirill of 
Smolensk:
The Assembly did not take place under the auspices of the Russian 
Orthodox Church but with its spiritual participation ... If the Assembly 
had been conceived as a political event, then the Russian Church would 
never have taken part in it.46
Despite the Metropolitan's disagreement, the Assembly did seem to be a political 
event. At the Assembly political formulations were agreed upon, such as who 
were considered to be ethnic Russians (Great Russians, Little Russians 
(Ukrainians), Belarussians and those who converted to Orthodoxy) and a re­
creation of the USSR was supported. In addition, the Assembly asserted that:
the democratic concept of "the separation of powers" was a Western 
invention unsuitable for Russia. "The idea of the separation of powers," 
the Assembly decided, "will never take hold on Russian Orthodox soil.
^ Vladlen Sirtokln, as quoted in Dunlop, 18.
Dunlop, 15.
^  Dunlop, 15.
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because as the Lord said, 'Every kingdom divided against itself is brought 
to desolation.. .'(Matthew 12:25)."^^
If the Church's anti-Western profile was not enough, it also engaged in
spiritual protectionism, attempting to limit Christian competition. On 28 April
1993 Patriarch Aleksii sent letters to the Ministry of Justice proposing
a joint commission of state officials and representatives of religious 
organizations... and that that commission be granted powers for a period 
of five to seven years to veto the licensing and activities of foreign 
religious organizations.
Further to that request, the Moscow Patriarchate led a campaign to monitor, and
in some cases outlaw, the evangelism and proselytism of foreign missionaries. In
an address in Kostroma Patriarch Aleksii stated:
The work of the Russian Church for the rebirth of society is threatened by 
the expansion of foreign missions in Russia. Hundreds of thousands of 
very different preachers have invaded Russia. There is great tension in 
our country owing to divisions between people on political and 
nationalistic issues. There is a danger of similar divisions between people 
on political and nationalistic grounds, the Patriarchate wants to prevent 
this and to help our society to be stable. So the Patriarchate has suggested 
to parliament that it pass a law proclaiming a moratorium on religious 
propaganda from outside.^^
Ironically, that same day as the request for the joint commissions the Patriarch
began his non-political profile of the Church, declaring that the Church should
stay out of politics, that clergy should refuse to be parliamentary candidates
stating "we should not join any political parties or movements and be equally
Stated by the Assembly, cited by Dunlop, 16.
^ Pospielovsky, 63.
Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 92.
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fair to our parishioners whatever their political views".5o Patriarch Aleksii 
avoided direct confrontation with any extremists and preached about morality, 
moderation and tolerance to the nation and its leaders.
On July 14, 1993 amendments to the 1990 Law on the Freedom of 
Conscience were adopted by the Supreme Soviet. These amendments included 
the creation of a parliamentary liaison commission, which consisted of members 
of the Committee on the Freedom of Conscience and representatives of 
registered religions in Russia. Further, the amendments denied the preaching 
and missionary activities of foreigners unless they were requested by a local 
religious organization -  and in this case they still needed a license from the 
Committee. The amendments further outlined that the four traditional religions 
were Russian Orthodoxy, Judaism, Islam, and Buddhism. These amendments 
were vetoed by Yeltsin on principle as violations of religious freedom.
Since 1991 the Church had not proved itself to be a clear supporter of 
democracy, pluralism or private ownership. The Church opposed some of 
Yeltsin's ideas and favoured a religious quasi-monopoly with strict limits to 
foreign Churches. Conservative Orthodox believers tended to be conservative in 
their political views: they were more favourable to harsher methods of instilling 
law and order and less concerned about the infringement on individual rights; 
they believed children should be taught to respect authority; they were positive 
towards Nicholas II and Stalin; wanted to ban "harmful" books; supported the
Pospielovsky, 65.
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isolation of people with AIDS; and were less supportive of multi-party politics 
and the market economy. Some conservative believers did support an Orthodox 
state.
In April 1994, after the political dust had settled and Yeltsin's pro-Western 
vision had emerged victorious over Rutskoi's Eurasianist, Soviet, great state 
coalition. Patriarch Aleksii finally took a stand against the right wing groups 
who had been making inroads into the Church, especially Metropolitan Ioann 
and the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods. The Patriarch outlined that Ioann did 
not speak for the Russian Orthodox Church. He distanced himself from Ioann 
and described the Russian Orthodox Church as being "free of racial prejudice. 
To whom is it not clear that to incite interethnic discord in our difficult time is 
madness? The opinion of one hierarch is, I repeat, not the opinion of the 
C h u r c h .  " 5 2  Patriarch Aleksii further rejected Ioann's "call for a religious war 
against Jews and for the expulsion of unbaptized Jews from Russian soil: We 
categorically deny the inevitability of religious wars between any confessions" .53 
He also went on to condemn the Union of Orthodox Brotherhoods of national 
chauvinism, which was a defilement of "truly Christian patriotism". What was 
the cause of the sudden break in silence? One reason was that Ioann and his 
supporters had been openly condemning Patriarch Aleksii for being philo- 
Semitic. Another reason was that Aleksii was giving his support to the "civic
51 White, 359 -  372.
52 Dunlop, 35.
53 Dunlop, 35-36.
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concord" of Yeltsin and Chernomyrdin, whereas Ioann as supporting General 
Rutskoi, who was opposed to it. However, the seeming 'change in heart' of 
Patriarch Aleksii only pertained to the Church's domestic policy. In terms of 
foreign policy the Church assumed the anti-Western stance of the neo-Soviets. 
Why? It seemed that the conservative opinion of the Church was more 
acceptable once the platform of the state had been secured. With Yeltsin securely 
heading the state, the Church could now take its position on foreign policy, as 
well as other matters.54
These external factors also impacted the Church internally. In November 
1993 there was a debate within the Church after a resolution from the Holy 
Synod regarding the involvement of clergy in politics. The Holy Synod 
determined that priests would not be permitted to stand for political office. This 
decision was initiated after priests elected to the Congress of People's Deputies 
ended up on opposite sides of the barricades during the October crisis. In 
December of that year the patriarch gave the four elected priests, one of whom 
was Father Gleb Yakunin, the option to resign from their elected position or be 
defrocked. Father Gleb Yakunin was the only priest to make the decision to be 
defrocked.55
One of the issues splitting the Church into reformers and traditionalists 
was the request for reforms to the Church itself. For example, reformers wanted
Dunlop, 35-36.
55 Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 105.
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to change the language of the liturgy from Old Church Slavonic to the vernacular 
Russian. Father Yakunin took the belief in the need for reformation so much to 
heart that in 2000 he established the Orthodox Church of the Resurrection in 
cooperation with the Ukrainian Orthodox Church -  Kiev Patriarchate and the 
True Orthodox Church. His initiatives were considered to be heretical by 
conservative members of the Russian Orthodox Church clergy as they included 
"making fasting voluntary, replacing Old Church Slavonic [with the language of 
the congregation] and reducing the length of services. A greater level of 
accountability was guaranteed by Yakunin's decision to make the financial 
records of the Church readily available."56 Yakunin later 'canonised' Father 
Men.
The schisms in the Church were regrettable to everyone, but unavoidable.
In 1998, the reality of the schisms came to the forefront when
Books by Orthodox theologians, among them Aleksandr Men', were 
burned by order of the local hierarch at a local theological seminary in 
Yekaterinburg. The books were denounced as 'heretical'. One 
commentator concluded; 'Now the appalling philosophy of schism within 
Orthodoxy is upon us and is taking hold in parishes of the Russian 
Orthodox Church... . Active efforts are under way to divide members of 
the Orthodox community into "clean" and "unclean"
56 Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 104.
57 Knox, 105.
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BISHOPS COUNCIL 2000
In light of the many political and social changes in Russia, a Bishops Council was 
convened in 2000 in order to outline the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in 
relation to the state as well as society. From August 13 - 16, 2000 there was a 
convention of the Jubilee Bishops Council of the Church in Moscow. The theme 
of the Council was the "Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox 
Church". Out of that Council came a document of that name outlining the 
Church's positions and roles about various social issues. In this document, the 
Church acknowledged in the contemporary world that the word "nation" could 
refer to either the ethnic community or the citizens of the state. The relationship 
between the Church and state must take both of these meanings into account. 
The Church acknowledged that relations between Church and state had changed 
over time, and outlined how the state "orders worldly life". Yet the Church, it 
was noted, was "not submissive to the elements of the world". Therefore, the 
state had no grounds, in the eyes of the Church, for a dominant role in the 
relationship between the Church and state. The Church would respect the state 
and obey the state, but the Church would only really answer to God.^®
The support of the Church for the state was a matter of choice. This idea 
is problematic, since by acknowledging that it would obey the state, the Church 
by implication recognized its possible subservience to the state. The Church also
Jubilee Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, August 13 -  16,2000. "Bases of the 
Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church", Moscow
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acknowledged that the state is "blessed" by God and that the Church supports 
the state as well as encourages individual submission to the state because the 
state is needed in order to prevent anarchy. The state is absolute, but only in 
temporal affairs. Since the Church is founded by Cod, the state must also respect 
the Church. The Church's goal is "the eternal salvation of people while the goal 
of the state is their well being on earth."^^ The Church recognizes that the state is 
secular; however that recognition does not condone the removal of religion from 
the public sphere. Instead, there is an expectation of cooperation in areas that are 
relevant to the Church. In the relationship between Church and state, the 
Church should not assume state powers or initiatives, but should exercise 
influence on state decisions. The state should not interfere with the Church; that 
is to say, the state should not interfere with the Russian Orthodox Church in 
particular.
Full cooperation between Church and state, however, could only exist in 
an Orthodox state. Through this assertion, the Bishops' Council expresses its 
recognition of the basis for symphonia. Symphony is "essentially cooperation, 
mutual support and mutual responsibility without one's side intruding into the 
exclusive domain of the o t h e r " and requires two partners only -  the state and 
the Russian Orthodox Church.
Jubilee Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, August 13 -  16,2000. "Bases of the 
Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church", Moscow  
Jubilee Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, August 13 -  16,2000. "Bases of the 
Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church", Moscow
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The greatest blessings granted to human beings by God's ultimate grace 
are priesthood and kingdom, the former (priesthood. Church authority) 
taking care of divine affairs, while the latter (kingdom, government) 
guiding and taking care of human affairs, and both, come from the same 
source, embellishing human life.^^
Symphony, the Council argued, did not exist in Byzantium in a pure form as the
Church was subject to claims from the head of the state. Within Russia, the
relationship between Church and state has been more harmonious, with a few
deviations (Ivan the Terrible, Tsar Alexis and Patriarch Nikon). The Local
Councip2 made the declaration that in the years of 1917-18, while the empire was
collapsing, "the demand to separate Church and state was likened to the wish
that the sun should not shine and fire should not warm up." Currently, despite
the belief that the "symphonic norm" has been distorted, the Church still aims to
solidify its relationship with the state.
In the resolution of the Council in the legal status of the Orthodox Church 
of Russia, the state is called upon to accept, in particular, these provisions: 
the Russian Orthodox Church, being part of the one Universal Church of 
Christ, shall have the pre-eminent public and legal status among other 
confessions in the Russian State, which befits her as the great shrine for 
the overwhelming majority of the population and a great historical force 
that built the Russian State... As soon as they are made public, decrees 
and statutes issued by the Orthodox Church for herself in the order 
established by herself, as well as deeds of the Church government and 
court shall be recognised by the state as legally valid and important unless 
they violate state laws... State laws concerning the Orthodox Church shall 
be issued only with the consent of the Church authorities.^^
Jubilee Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, August 13 -  16, 2000. "Bases of the 
Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church", Moscow.
® "Local Council" is the term used in the "Bases of the Social Concept" document.
^ Jubilee Bishops Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, August 13 -  16,2000. "Bases of the 
Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church", Moscow.
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This statement seems to contradict the previous on obeying the state. It would 
seem that while the Church chose to tread carefully during this Council, trying 
not to offend the state, the Bishops still wanted to get their point across that the 
Church is not under the control of the state, and may obey but only under 
conditions agreed to by the Church authorities. This position certainly gives the 
Russian Orthodox Church privilege among the other faiths of Russia. Different 
interpretations of this statement give the example that if the state decided to pass 
a law that made it impossible for anything but pluralism of faiths, the Russian 
Orthodox Church could step in to influence that -  as was done during the 
drafting of the 1997 Freedom of Conscience Law.
In Chapter One the "two swords" theory of power is discussed. The 
Council defines this theory as the power of Church and state being separate but 
still going back to the Bishops of Rome (as the theory was applied in medieval 
western Europe). The Council's own interpretation of this analogy is that the 
Church is separate from state in regards to doctrine and teachings, which, the 
Council argues, cannot be changed regardless of the wishes of the state. The 
Council vows that the Church will not denounce the state, even under 
persecution, and that while the Church may obey the state, loyalty to God will 
always come first. The Council further discusses that if they find it is impossible 
to obey the state, the Church may enter dialogue with other parties to institute 
change. Four possible options of these possible dialogues are listed: dialogue 
with the authority; dialogue with the people in order to change the legislation
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through the democratic process; dialogue with international bodies and world 
opinion; or encouraging believers to peaceful disobedience.^ This statement 
almost reads as a bit of threat to the state, as it outlines each of the avenues the 
Church has in order to make change in order to better suit the Church. This 
request for the state to uphold the position of the Church is further outlined in 
the request that other religions should be considered by taking into account the 
factors of numbers, historical relevance, and links to culture.
In a manner that seems consistent with other Church discussions on the 
state and the historical evidence of the Church being slow to align itself with any 
system of government, the Council states that it does not give preference to any 
system of government. The Church would only like to cooperate in areas that 
benefit the Church, individuals, and society. The Council goes so far as to list the 
areas where the Church wants to cooperate, and where they do not.
Table 2: Parameters of Cooperation/No Cooperation in Church-state Relations 
in Russia 
Cooperation:
• Peacemaking on international, inter-ethnic and civic levels and promoting 
mutual understanding and cooperation among people, nations and states
• Concern for the preservation of morality in society
• Spiritual, cultural, moral and patriotic education and formation
• Charity and the development of joint social programs
“  Ibid. 
65 Ibid.
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• Preservation, restoration and development of the historical and cultural 
heritage, including concern for the preservation of historical and cultural 
monuments
• Dialogue with governmental bodies of all branches and levels on issues 
important for the Church (emphasis added) and society, including the 
development of appropriate laws, by-laws, instructions and decisions
• Care of the military and law-enforcement workers and their spiritual and 
moral education
• Efforts to prevent crime and care of prisoners
• Science and research
• Culture and arts
• Healthcare
• Work of ecclesiastical and secular mass media
• Preservation of the environment
• Economic activity for the benefit of the Church, state and society
• Support for the institution of family, for motherhood and childhood
• Opposition to the work of pseudo-religious structures presenting a threat 
to the individual and society
No Cooperation:
• Political struggle, election agitation, campaigns in support of particular
political parties and public and political leaders
• Waging civil war or aggressive external war
• Direct participation in intelligence or any other activity that demands
secrecy by law even in making one's confession or reporting to the Church 
authorities
The Church shows, through this list, that the sphere of its influence is envisioned 
as quite large, and open to much interpretation as noted by the italicized "on 
issues important for the Church". The Church continues by outlining its 
relationship with the division of state powers at all levels, those levels being 
national, regional and local. In relation to the legislative bodies, the Church 
requests dialogue on those laws that impact the life of the Church, Church-state 
relations and the spheres of the Church's social concerns. Dialogue with the
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executive power remains the same as that with the legislative bodies with the 
addition that the "Church maintains contacts on the respective level with central 
and local executive power bodies". Finally, in regards to judicial bodies, the 
Church only seeks involvement in regards to representation of Church interests 
in court. Yet, secular courts, the Church holds, have no place in internal Church 
disputes.
For the most part, contact or cooperation with the state is only done 
through the Patriarch and the Holy Synod, or by representation with permission 
in writing (which is all done from level to level). The canons of the Russian 
Orthodox Church prohibit clergy from participating in affairs of the state 
government, including representative bodies of power. However, the clergy 
should vote and are welcome to voice their stand on social issues, but only 
through the Councils, Church authorities and those empowered by them.
Overall the document Bases of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox 
Church leaves many vague and grey areas to be open to interpretation. This has 
no doubt been done on purpose in order to allow for different interpretations as 
are needed for a situation and /o r defence. For example, the wording "maintain 
contacts" discussed in the previous paragraph leaves much open -  does contact 
refer to influence? What are the parameters of that contact? As well. Church 
cooperation is poorly defined. Does it imply exclusive cooperation, or in 
collaboration with other confessions? The end result is that the document is both 
overt and covert in that it easily reads as what the Church actually believes, but
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there are undercurrents of broad interpretation that can be used if needed. It is 
very much a 'have your cake and eat it too' scenario. As per Stephen Shenfield's 
analysis, the Church wants the best of both worlds, the tsarist and the Soviet.
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS UNDER PUTIN
In 2000, Putin followed in Yeltsin's legacy and immediately sought the support of 
the Russian Orthodox Church. Putin was very attentive to the hierarchy of the 
Church and continued meetings with the Patriarch. The Church was hoping the 
state would return the remainder of its assets and for Orthodox education to be 
introduced into the schools. The Patriarch's strategy with the state was "one that 
[was] intended to preserve the Orthodox Church's dominant position, but one 
that [was] far less politically based and more open to Church-state separation 
than many would expect".^ After all, the Church may be separate from the 
state, but not from society and it needed to maintain a voice in some situations, 
as will be noted by the two case studies on education and freedom of expression. 
These situations, the Church asserted, were limited to those involving social and 
economic issues, public morality and international relations. The Church viewed 
its most important role as one of "safeguarding civil peace and accord in 
society" .67
^ Davis, Derek, 664. 
Davis, Derek, 665.
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To its own end, the Church wanted to impress on the state that Russian 
identity was based in Orthodoxy and therefore there was a need to limit foreign 
influence on Russians, especially in religious terms. The Patriarch was seeking a 
preferred status for the Church, which would ultimately become the guardian of 
the nation with the creation of unity through religious nationalism. As already 
discussed, the Church released the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in 2000, which outlined the need for mutual independence of the Church 
and the state, but allowed for the cooperation of the two in some civic matters. 
The Church wanted its place in society secured, in which the Church was free to 
do what it pleased while being allowed to influence the state on issues that the 
Church felt were relevant.
The 'cooperation' of the Church became apparent in March 2000 when 
some members of the Church equated state initiatives with the work of the Anti- 
Christ. For example, a huge uproar was heard when the new individual 
taxpayers' numbers (INN) included the number '666'. The Holy Synod stepped 
in and while it supported the introduction of the system, requested 
understanding of those individuals who were more superstitious and "to 
introduce neither more nor less than a system of bar codes different from that in 
use in the whole of the rest of the w o r l d "  The Church wanted society to take 
Russian Orthodox faith into account as much as possible. The changing of the
^ Aleksandr Verkhovsky, "The Role of the Russian Orthodox Church in Nationahst, Xenophobic 
and Antiwestern Tendencies in Russia Today; Not Nationalism, but Fundamentalism" Religion, 
State & Society, 30, no. 4(2002): 338.
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INN system was due solely to the outcries of the Church, which created a 
relationship based less on 'cooperation' and more on 'interference' and influence. 
The Holy Synod's anti-globalist tendencies gave more freedom to the 
fundamentalists, as discussed earlier, which led anti-globalists to think that the 
"Russian Orthodox Church and the state are the main obstacles in the path of 
aspirations for the world domination".6^
On 5 June 2001 a draft Concept of state policy in the religious sphere, 
partially authored by the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Justice of the 
Russian Federation for Moscow, was published and advertised. The Concept 
proposed to legalize and regulate the privileges of 'traditional' religions and 
sorted religions by 3 criteria: number of followers, historical contribution, and 
activities as a unifying source in Russian society. In November 2001 the Moscow 
Patriarchate and the Central Muslim Spiritual Directorate petitioned to have the 
1997 law amended to add clauses of privilege for 'traditional' religious 
organizations. The Concept from June 2001 had been aimed at changes to the 
1997 law but it faced opposition from liberal government officials. Duma deputy 
Aleksandr Chuyev recommended that a 'traditional' religious organization be 
defined by those which have been in existence for at least 85 years in Russia and 
that these 'traditional' religious organizations receive privileges such as free 
television time and be allowed to teach in s c h o o l s . S o m e  within the Church
® Verkhovsky, 342. 
™ Verkhovsky, 337.
112
hierarchy did not feel that definition and the outlining of privileges was enough, 
while others argued that 85 years was not long enough to be considered 
'traditional' and that bureaucrats had no place deciding what was 'traditional' or 
not: "the ROC had certain natural privileges which this proposal would 
sideline" 71
In 2002, further legislation was brought in to offer preferential treatment 
for the Russian Orthodox Church. Orthodox priests were invited to teach 
religion in schools (after regular school hours), state money was given for 
charitable work, media services and education efforts. Zoe Knox further notes 
that the Church received economic favours from the state as well as tax 
exemptions on items such as imported tobacco for sale by the Church.
PUTIN'S 'MANAGED DEMOCRACY'
As mentioned in the discussion on the state in this chapter, Putin inherited a 
disjointed and confused Russia from Yeltsin and his 'ten year revolution'. Putin 
set to work immediately to re-centralize the government and to establish more 
strength in the state. The result of Putin's initiative was what scholars call a
^ Verkhovsky, 337.
^ Knox, "Postsoviet Challenges," 87 -  113. These privileges were the source of some rumours 
and assertions of corruption within in the Church hierarchy as well as collaborators with Russian 
organized crime. ("Russian Church Linked to Crime, Corruption" The Vancouver Sun (June 30, 
2000); "More on Russian Orthodox Finances" East-West Church & M inistry Report 9 (Fall 2001): 10.)
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'managed d e m o c r a c y ' o r  a combination of democracy and authoritarianism. 
McFaul describes it as a "system that is far more 'managed' than democratic" in 
which Putin has not fought for human rights and has eroded already weak 
democratic institutions, but is far too modern to revert to the dictatorship of the 
Soviet Union. Daniel Kimmage aptly describes 'managed democracy' as 
follows:
Managed "democracy" is what happens when a ruling elite feels obligated 
to hold elections but does everything in its power to control their 
outcome. In the post-Soviet world, managed democracy is the brainchild 
of a political elite that grudgingly accepts elections as a precondition for 
legitimacy, yet retains a Soviet understanding of politics as a dark art of 
manipulation. The practice of managed democracy amounts to a grab-bag 
of dirty tricks and a playing field that is anything but level — state- 
controlled media serve up puff pieces to promote favoured candidates 
and smear campaigns to denigrate undesirable ones, election commissions 
ignore gross violations and punish minor ones, duplicate candidates 
confuse voters. The list is long and sordid. But its purpose is short and 
sweet — to reduce the necessary evil of elections to a predictable exercise 
that allows elites to devote the bulk of their time to more pressing 
pursuits, mainly the exploitation of public office for private gain.^^
William Clark states further that.
Managed democracy ... means a combination of democratic institutions 
and authoritarian institutions. Of course, it's clear. Russia now is in the 
process ... not from communist dictatorship, but from the stage of Yeltsin 
anarchy and chaos to the functioning democratic institutions. And in this 
way, to make [the] situation stable, [the] Kremlin had to use both 
democratic and not democratic methods. It's just [the] rule of nature.^^
73 This term has had its conception attributed to Michael McFaul in his article "Ten Years After 
the Soviet Breakup: A Mixed Record, An Uncertain Future" in the journal of Democracy, 12, 4 
(October 2001): 87 -  94.
74 Ibid.
75 Daniel Kimmage, " Kyrgyzstan: The Failure Of Managed Democracy" Radio Free Europe/Radio 
Liberty (12 April 2005), http://w w w .rferl.org /featuresarticle/2005/4/D99CFEFE-BA22-41A9- 
AF8B-A8BE178D80BC.html
75 William A. Clark "Russia at the Polls: Potemkin Democracy" Problems of Post Communism 
(March/April 2004): 23.
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Over the time that Putin has been president, he has successfully created a 
parliament with little or no objection to his actions or the Kremlin's. In the Duma 
elections in 2003, under the restrictions imposed on those who could claim seats, 
the United Party, supporters of Putin, gained a majority of the seats and control 
of the Duma committees as well as the Duma Council, which is responsible for 
running the Duma. Grigorii Yavlinskii of the party Yabloko stated: "Russia has 
no independent parliament a n y m o r e " . N o t  only did the Duma elections secure 
support for Putin, but the Duma was considered a very 'grey' parliament, which 
-leaned in the direction it was told to. Clark argues that during Putin's current 
term the cycle in Russian political sentiment may lead more towards the 
'managed' than the 'democracy' in order to further strengthen the powers of the 
Kremlin and bring some sort of stabilisation to the country.
Putin is a strong partner for the Russian Orthodox Church due to his more 
conservative nature and his ambivalence towards democracy and human rights 
(e.g. Chechen War). As well, Putin is a traditionalist, which is also of benefit to 
the Church. Despite Putin's acknowledgement of the need to have some sort of a 
relationship with the West, he remains cautious and wary of Western pressures. 
Religious pluralism would be difficult to support as a policy under a political 
sphere of managed democracy. While pluralism is not contrary to managed 
democracy, pluralism is more of an attribute of liberal democracy and civil
77 Clark, 26.
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society, which does not coincide with Putin's idea of a managed democracy. The 
two schools of thought represent different ideologies -  managed democracy 
maintains a strong level of control over the determinations of democratic 
processes. Orthodoxy, on the other hand, is more supportive of managed 
democracy as it also supports a tighter control over society and institutions. 
Orthodoxy is in harmony with tradition and strong leadership.
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Chapter Five 
Case Studies in Church-State Relations
Up until now, the discussion has focussed on the theoretical foundations 
of the relationship between Church and state and the changes that have taken 
place in Church-state relations over time. What follows is an examination of two 
different cases in which the Church exerted influence over the state. The first 
case study gives an idea of the relations between the Church and state from a 
very early period in the post-Soviet era and of how the Church exerted its 
influence on state policy. The second case study will discuss Church influence 
over the right to freedom of speech and freedom of expression in contemporary 
Moscow.
EDUCATION
In 1992 three Russian delegates from the Ministry of Education went to the 
United States to talk to some Christian teachers about how the Russians could 
include Christian values in Russian schools.  ^The Ministry of Education felt that 
a void had been left in the education of morality with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The inspiration for religious morality in schools came from the pre-Soviet 
traditions and the return of religion into people's lives. The 1990 Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations ended the ban on religious
1 Perry Glanzer, "Teactrmg Christian Ethics in Russian Pubhc Schools: The Testing of Russia's 
Church -  State Boundaries" Journal of Church and State, 41, no.2 (Spring, 1999): 285 -  306. Much 
of the information that follows is taken from the work done by Perry Clanzer.
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education, ended the official funding of atheistic propaganda, returned legal 
standing to religious organizations and allowed religious leaders to engage in 
religious instruction, charitable activities and publishing. However, religious 
education itself had been essentially ignored to this point. But the events that led 
up to this meeting in 1992 actually began in 1990.
In defence of allowing Christian ethics to be taught in schools, Evgeny 
Kurkin, the Russian Deputy Minister of Education, stated that: "seventy years 
ago, we closed God out of our country, and it has caused so many problems in 
our society we cannot count them ... We must put God back into our country, 
and we must begin with our children. The impetus for this move towards 
Christian morality was the desire to replace communist morality education. 
Kurkin was less worried about where the offer of this training in morality 
originated. In this case it was offered by American evangelists.
In 1990, a viewing of the film JESUS was given to a group of Communist 
officials, including either the minister or deputy minister of education from 
almost every republic. In January 1991, a group of American Christians with the 
JESUS Film Project, led by Paul Eshleman, and a division of Campus Crusade for 
Christ, circulated 66,000 free copies of the JESUS video to Russian schools. 
American teachers were offered by the JESUS Film Project to be sent to train 
Russian teachers in a course on Christian ethics and morality. The division of the 
JESUS project spearheading this endeavour was the International School Project
2 Glanzer, 290.
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(ISP). The ISP had the task of writing the curriculum, but it faced problems with
the Church-state relations that then existed in Russia, especially since those
writing the curriculum believed that in order to lead a moral life an individual
needed to have a relationship with Christ. The Ministry of Education insisted
that the curriculum adhere to Russian Church-state laws, which outlined that the
curriculum had to be educational, not evangelical. However, Eschleman had
another point of view:
The biggest lie in the whole world today is the separation of Church and 
state. It is absolutely the most devastating, wrong thing ever perpetrated 
on mankind. The very first thing we ought to do is develop our whole 
educational system around the Scriptures. It's (sic) the principles for how 
to live Iife.3
Eshleman had no problem using the government to exclude other religions from 
being brought into the educational system: "Should it be open for every other 
religion in the world? No, I don't think it should be. That's because I'm  a 
follower of God and His Word. And that's why I think the Bible ought to be 
taught in the public school system."^ However, the writers of the curriculum 
wanted to ensure that they did not support a state-imposed Christianity, or an 
American ideology of pluralism on the Russian people. Their aim was to 
encourage a "voluntarism", or a "Principle of Voluntary Commitment" to Jesus.
In May 1991 250 Soviet teachers and principals gathered in the Moscow 
suburb of Perova to take the ISP curriculum. There were three parts to the
3 Glanzer, 292. 
 ^Glanzer, 293.
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curriculum in order to balance the educational aspect as well as the evangelical. 
The curriculum made a strong argument for Christianity and participants were 
given the opportunity to receive Christ after watching the film JESUS at the end 
of the meeting.
On December 25, 1991, the USSR ceased to exist. The new Russian
Ministry of Education wanted to continue the partnership with ISP. The ISP was
able to avoid the vague laws governing Church-state relations by proselytizing
and evangelizing through voluntary supplementary classes to individuals who
were interested in converting.
Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, two other American Christian
organizations partnered to form the CoMission -  the Association of Christian
Schools International and Walk Thru the Bible. The CoMission started Bible
studies with Russian converts and those who were considering converting. The
mission statement of this organization declared, "the purpose was to start a local
Church within walking distance of everybody
While ISP leaders faced the difficulty of including enough educational 
content to downplay its evangelistic elements, the CoMission's attempt to 
form small-group Bible studies for converted teachers or those 
considering Christianity further weakened their educational front and 
clearly exposed their evangelistic and Church-planting intentions.^
Kenneth Woodward of Neumveek further wrote:
In theory, the visiting Americans are supposed to train Russian teachers in 
teaching Christian ethics, not doctrine. To the Russians, this means
5 Glanzer, 296. 
® Glanzer, 296.
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demonstrating how the values Jesus taught, such as forgiveness, can 
benefit secular society. But in fact, the CoMission's teaching manuals say 
very little about the ethics Jesus taught: the Sermon on the Mount, for 
example, is ignored. Instead the manual's entire thrust is to lead students 
step by step toward making a "voluntary" commitment to Jesus as 
"Saviour and Lord". In short, to act like Jesus, students must first have 
faith in him. Moreover, the American evangelists are not supposed to 
teach the students themselves.^
The CoMission was criticized by the ISP for not respecting the laws of Church-
state relations and Western Christian organizations as a rule raised concerns
among other foreign missions in Russia for the CoMission's perceived lack of
respect for Russian Church-state relations. Walter Sawatsky, a scholar of
Protestantism in the former Soviet Union outlined that:
Most Western missions...show minimal interest in Church and state 
questions, the social role of Soviet Christians, or their potential 
contribution to economics and national education. Yet the capacity of 
Soviet evangelicals to respond to such issues will determine whether they 
will be a serious factor in Soviet society, or whether they will become 
increasingly irrelevant.®
Despite these concerns, the state allowed voluntary religious education. In the
meantime, both the ISP and The CoMission worked to develop a relationship
with the Russian Orthodox Church. Father Ioann Ekonometsev, the Chairman of
the Department of Religious Education of the Moscow Patriarchate, was invited
to an ISP session. He, in turn, sent three representatives who reported
favourably on the curriculum. By 1993 there were continued discussions with
Ekonometsev and agreements were made for the Campus Crusade for Christ and
 ^Kenneth L. Woodward, "lisus Kristos Loves You" Newsweek, 121, Issue 1 (January 4 ,1993):45. 
® Glanzer, 296-7.
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the ISP to aid the Russian Orthodox Church in some of their projects. But this 
partnership was never put into action due to the growing concerns of the 
Russian Orthodox Church.
Meanwhile, The CoMission was sending out mixed messages to the 
American public and its partners in Russia regarding its work in Russia, despite 
requests by the ISP to maintain consistency in their messages. In a 1993 trip to 
the United States, Father Ekonometsev and Patriarch Aleksii 11 learned of the 
inconsistency through concerns raised by American Orthodox priests. The 
CoMission had not fully disclosed its intentions to start churches to any of their 
cohorts in Russia, but was pushing that mandate to the American public in order 
to gain American support for their mission. Father Ekonometsev met with the 
leaders of ISP and the Deputy Minister of Education upon his return to Russia. 
He discussed with them how The CoMission was starting churches in Russia 
through their Bible studies. The state sought assurance from The CoMission that 
they were not "Church-planting", and that assurance was given by both the ISP 
and The CoMission. The CoMission itself had never been endorsed by the 
Russian Minister of Education, only the parallel Soviet ministry, creating a rather 
tenuous political partnership. The Russian Orthodox Church encouraged the 
cessation of this partnership.
In 1995 a Russian Orthodox priest in Nizhny Novgorod expressed concern 
to his Archbishop regarding local activities of a CoMission member. The 
CoMission's mandate had been to work only with teachers, but this particular
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member had breached the agreement by working with students. Documents
were found by the priest outlining The CoMission's goals as they were being told
to Americans. According to these documents. The CoMission intended to have
12,000 missionaries sent to Russia over the next five years in order to start Bible
studies that would later become churches. Photocopies of these documents were
forwarded to the Speaker of the Upper House of Parliament and to Viktor
Chernomyrdin, the prime minister. From there the information was forwarded
to the Minister of Education, Evgenii Tkachenko. The information sent included
a letter from the Archbishop informing the Minister of the Protocol of Intention
signed by the Deputy Minister of Education Asmolov. In the letter the
Archbishop also claimed that
Russia is a mono-confessional state whose history is closely related to the 
Orthodox Church. Thus, the Ministry of Education should not associate 
with the missions' organizations flourishing in Russia. The Federation 
Council, as representatives of the history of Russia and the legislative 
body, cannot give a negative response to the stand of the Russian 
Orthodox Church.^
The Archbishop went on to request disciplinary action to be taken against 
Asmolov and that the relationship be severed with both the ISP and The 
CoMission. The Ministry of Education found that The CoMission had committed 
a legal violation and complied with the requests of the Archbishop. To the 
Russian Orthodox Church, it was a matter of fairness, or lack thereof, as the case
 ^Minutes from meeting between Perry Glanzer and Alexei Brudnov, Tim Petty, and Elaine 
Griffith, trans. Vladimir Ilukhin, 14 February 1995 as cited in Glanzer, 303.
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may be. According to Yelena Vaschenko Alexandrovich, a staff member of the
Department of External Church Relations of the Russian Orthodox Church,
The result of the example in Nizhny Novgorod is that the Orthodox 
priests were kicked out from school. So The CoMission comes, and 
Orthodox priests are kicked out, and the Americans start to teach. This 
brings out a very negative reaction from our Church and from most of the 
population... May be it wouldn't have been so bad because there is no 
doubt that the schools do need help and Christian education, but this is all 
going like a competition when Americans force out Russia priests.^°
The Russian Orthodox Church went on to argue that if there was to be an
openness of religious beliefs, there needed to be a level playing field. The
Russian Orthodox Church believed it did not have the ability, especially
financially, to compete with the American missionaries.
If religious liberty for all religious groups was to exist, the Orthodox 
wanted it to be fairly granted. The Orthodox Church had good reason to 
distrust Western missionaries who were using government schools to 
further their evangelistic and Church planting aims without revealing this 
agenda.ii
Father Ekonometsev claimed:
We can't do as Americans do, because we can't have such sects equal to 
our traditional Orthodox Church. We need legal laws to prevent them
from their activity.^^
In Father Ekonometsev's eyes there could be no equal in Russia to the Russian 
Orthodox Church, either theologically or historically. The Russian Orthodox 
Church wanted to secure a place of privilege for themselves. "Orthodox leaders
10 From interview between Yelena Speranskaya and Perry Glanzer, 5 May 1995 as cited in 
Glanzer, 304.
11 Glanzer, 305.
12 From interview between Father Vladimir Vaschenko Alexandrovich and Perry Glanzer, 30 June 
1995 as cited in Glanzer, 305.
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believed the state should prohibit the access of Western missionaries to Russia in 
order to help the Orthodox Church recover its special place of privilege in 
Russian s o c i e t y . I n  1997 the Russian Orthodox Church received its wish as 
foreign missionary work was inhibited and access to public schools was 
prohibited. The patriarch applauded the decision as he argued that foreign 
religious groups were not only a danger to the Orthodox Church, but also to the 
unity of the state.
This case study shows the tenuous position of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in the 1990s. The Church was relying on its partnership with the state in 
order to ward off foreign infringement on Russian Christian souls. The Church 
did not have the financial backing to compete with American missionaries. The 
only cards the Church had to play were its link to the state, history, and Russia 
itself. The accusation of the Church towards the activities of the CoMission was 
used to gain advantage and ground in the battle against foreign missionaries. 
The relationship between the Church and state that emerged set a dangerous 
precedent in Church influence over state initiatives.
THE ARTS
The extent to which the conservative tables have turned on Russian society and 
again, how the Church plays a role in substantiating the conservative tilt, can be 
seen in the case study to follow on the right to freedom of expression.
13 Glanzer, 305.
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In January 2003, an exhibition at the Andrei Sakharov Museum and Public
Center created a controversy that further raised the issue of Church-state
relations, and highlighted the imposing role that the Russian Orthodox Church
had filled over time. The exhibit was called Caution! Religion and was a collection
of paintings and works by 39 artists. One of the most controversial pieces was a
painting of Jesus' face imposed on a Coca-Cola logo next to the words 'This is My
Blood'. According to Yuri Samodurov, the director of the Sakharov Center, the
intent of the exhibit was two-fold:
On one hand, it is an appeal to respect religion and believers. On the 
other hand, it is a warning about the dangers of any kind of religious 
fundamentalism, be it Orthodox or Muslim, and about the danger of 
fusing religion and the state into some sort of theocratic dictatorship.^^
However, the exhibit was taken by religious conservatives as an insult to religion
and to Orthodoxy in particular and was vandalized by a "group of young
acolytes from the Russian Orthodox Church of St. Nicholas in Pyzhi."^^ The
artwork was spray painted with graffiti by the Orthodox extremists. After being
taken into custody, the group was later released because the court decided that
the exhibit incited their actions. The Russian Orthodox Church was quick to
come to their defence. Under the request of the Russian Orthodox Church, the
Russian State Duma directed the Procurator General to investigate the organizers
and the exhibit. After ten months of investigation, three of the five^^ organizers
Vladimir Simonov, "Does Church threaten secular life in Russia?" RIA Novosti (7 June 2005) 
Edward Kline, Briefing Paper: A rt of Trial: The Case of Samodurov, Vasilovskaya and Mikhalchuk, (11 
March 2005): 2 at www.russiaontrial.org/pdfs/Sakharov.Fdtn.pdf (August 5, 2005)
15 The other two organizers were Armenian and had left Moscow
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of the event were taken into custody and charged under Article 282 of the 
Criminal Code for "inciting religious hatred and offending the feelings of 
religious believers".
The trial began in June 2004, but the judge presiding over the proceedings, 
Judge Natalia Larina, "criticized the indictment and returned the case to the 
procurator's o f f i c e " T h e  trial against the three remaining organizers -  Yuri 
Samodurov (director), Ludmila Vasilovskaya (curator) and Anna Mikhalchuk 
(artist) -  reopened in September 2004 with Judge Vladimir Proshchenko 
presiding. The trial had come to represent much more than individuals being 
charged for inciting religious hatred, it had become a representation of the role of 
Russian Orthodox Church and its seemingly subtle shift in status as moral arbiter 
equal to that of the Communist Party under the Soviet regime. As well, it 
represented a reversion back to the days of the Soviet Union where artists and 
curators were persecuted for their opinions reflected either in their art or their 
exhibitions. On 13 August 2004, in the Times Literary Supplement, Zinovy Zinik 
stated
An ominous court hearing is taking place in Moscow. It started last year 
with an ostensibly marginal show of conceptual art installations called 
Bezvare, Religion!, held in the Sakharov Human Rights Centre. Most of the 
exhibits were parodies, pop-art style, of the mass perception of religious 
doctrine and its iconography in contemporary Russia, where the 
influential Russian Orthodox Church has gradually replaced the old 
Communist Party of the USSR as moral arbiter and chief censor in matters 
spiritual and ideological.
Kline, 2. 
18 Kline, 2.
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Earlier, in May 2003, an article entitled "Orthodox Bulldozer" in ARTnezus by
Konstantin Akinsha discussed the exhibit. The title of the article makes reference
to the bulldozing of an exhibit by the KGB in 1974.
In his speech at the show's opening, curator Arutyun Zulumyan, who is 
now in hiding, called for a careful and respectful treatment of religion, but 
he also warned of the danger of religious fundamentalism, both Muslim 
and Russian Orthodox, and the identification of the state with religion.
Political scientist Vladmir Pribylovsky, speaking to Radio Liberty, said 
that the growing support for 'nationalistic-conservative' ideals represents 
a turn away from the tolerance of the first Post-Soviet decade. 'Ten years 
ago it would have been unthinkable for Samodurov to be charged or for 
kids to be allowed to burn books on the street,' Pribylovsky said. 'Now 
it's allowed. It's the spirit of the times'.
Kline argues that the trial of the exhibit organizers is in direct violation of several
articles in Russia's Constitution, including Article 14; "The Russian Federation is
a secular state. No religion may be designated the official state religion or be
made mandatory"; Article 29: "Censorship is prohibited"; and Article 44:
"Everyone shall be guaranteed freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, technical
and other kinds of creative expression,
The trial has initiated dialogue concerning a topic of constant debate in all
"free" societies: where is the line drawn between freedom of expression and
incitement of hatred? However, despite this debate, most agree that criminal
charges should not have been laid. Serge Schmemann, editor of Tlie International
19 Kline, 3
Constitution of the Russian Federation, art. 14, 29, and 44, http://www.constitution.ru/en
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Herald Tribune, and son of a Russian Orthodox theologian, wrote an article in the 
Nezv York Times entitled "Balancing Art, the State and Religion Without Calling 
the Police":
My first reaction [to the indictment of Samodurov] was indignation and 
incredulity. The Russian Orthodox Church has become heavily identified 
with Russian nationalism and reaction, and some priests and believers 
have even found common cause with disgruntled old Communists. For 
someone who had spent a few years as a reporter in the old Soviet Union, 
the greater dismay came with seeing artists again treated as enemies of the 
state.
Art had been one of the major vehicles of resistance to the Soviet 
dictatorship: the closing of an exhibition of unofficial art in 1962 by Nikita 
Khrushchev and the bulldozing of an exhibition of unofficial art in 1974 
were among the milestones of the dissident movement. Sadder still, 
religion had been one of the major targets of Soviet repression, especially 
public demonstrations of belief, or religious imagery in art or literature. 
No doubt these memories were in the minds of the 39 artists who raised 
their works in the Sakharov Museum to warn against the state that has 
enforced "scientific atheism" so recently now embracing a national 
Church with the same ardour.2i
Whether or not the state is officially embracing the idea of a national Church is
up for debate; however, it cannot be denied that the Church does try to influence
the state in its decisions regarding art, education and public morality. In a letter
to President Putin on 2 February 2003, Archpriest Alexander Shargunov of St.
Nicholas of Pyzhi (the parish of the vandals of the exhibit), who is also the chair
of a group calling itself the Public Committee for the Moral Revival of the
Fatherland, stated:
Serge Schemarm, "Balancing Art, the State and Religion Without CaUing the Police" Nezo York 
Times, February 23, 2004.
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The Andrei Sakharov Public Center and Museum has functioned for 
several years in Moscow under the direction of Elena Bonner and Yuri 
Samodurov. For the entire period of its existence the Center has promoted 
anti-social values and defended bandits and criminals, especially 
Chechens. The Center's activities are clearly aimed at corrupting the 
morals of Russian society and the Russian army. The cunning use the 
slogan "Stop the War in Chechnya" for this purpose...
...We urge you, Mr. President, to take measures to close the Sakharov 
Center and Museum, particularly since this organization has forfeited the 
right to its connection with Andrei Sakharov. Sakharov, an atheist, 
defended the rights of persons persecuted for their religious beliefs and 
never had anything in common with blasphemous actions like the 
antireligious campaigns of the Soviet era.^
The comments within this letter blur the line between Church and state on a
number of different points. The Russian-Orthodox Church, which claims ta  want
to act as a peacekeeper and mediator in inter-ethnic conflict, has a clear opinion
on the war in Chechnya, especially when grouping bandits, criminals and
Chechens together. Further, if one were to consider that same war a civil war
(since technically, Chechnya is still a part of the Russian Federation), then this
letter also violates the assertion that the Church will not support the state in the
case of an internal conflict. It is ironic that while the outcry from the artistic
community and beyond is that the Russian Orthodox Church is encouraging
persecution and repression, the Church is arguing the same case against the
Sakharov Center.
On 28 March 2005, while the procurator had requested three years 
imprisonment for Samodurov, two years for Vasilovskaya, and two years for
22 Kline, 5.
130
Mikhalchuk, as well as a condition that none could ever hold a similar position in 
an organization again, the court found Samodurv and Vasilovskaya guilty of 
"carrying out actions aimed at inciting enmity, and humiliating the dignity of a 
group of people due to their nationality and their religious affiliation, carried out 
in public, and with the use of their official position" and fined 100,000 roubles 
each. Mikhalchuk was found not guilty on this count. The court explained that 
the lesser sentences were due to the fact that the defendants had good character 
and were active participants in public life.^ The lesser sentence may also be 
credited to human rights organizations that spoke out about the persecution of 
the three individuals charged. While the three individuals did not receive the 
sentences that the procurator had requested, they were still found guilty. Not 
only did the Russian Orthodox Church show its clear voice by coming to the 
defence of the vandals rather than the artists and museum workers, it also 
presented the message that there are limits to freedom of expression in Russia. 
The Church thus escaped responsibility for violating the freedom of expression 
law and condoning, if not inciting, vandalism.24
Church-state relations are as dynamic as ever. On one side the Church is 
separate from the state, but on the other side the Church wants the privilege of 
influencing the state and 'cooperating' in civic matters while at the same time 
inhibiting other confessions from doing the same. This chapter shows that the
23 web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR460102005?open&of=ENG-382 
^Kline, I.
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relationship between Church and state is not as separate, nor as defined, as some 
would believe. In the time following the collapse of the Soviet Union the Church 
has turned to the state as a shield against the threats to traditionalism and 
nationality, namely foreign missionaries and splinter groups, while the state has 
turned to the Church for legitimacy and support. Further to that, as was seen in 
the case of the Andrei Sakharov Museum and Public Center, the Church has 
gone from using the state as a shield to using the state as a sword in order to 
achieve the its own ends. What will that relationship between Church and state, 
embedded as it is in traditionalism and conservativism, have in store for the 
future of Russia? What will be the impact on the road to democracy?
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Chapter Six 
Conclusion
This thesis has discussed the ever-changing relationship between the 
Russian Orthodox Church and the state and the process through which the 
current relationship was developed. This final chapter will summarize the main 
themes of that process and how the process and the tension between the Church 
and state are inextricably linked. Throughout Russia's history many variables 
have impacted this relationship; including politics, ideology, leadership, foreign 
policy, and global-pressure. The relationship is rooted in Russian history and 
tradition.
Enamul Choudhury argues that "religion claims to be a source of ultimate 
meaning, moral virtues and community identity".^ This could be no more true 
than in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church, which claims that Russians 
draw so much of their identity through their belief in Orthodoxy. The Russian 
Orthodox Church was, and is, a "powerful symbol of Russian Statehood, 
tradition and culture".^
1 Enamul H. Choudhury "Culture, Religion and Inclusive Pubhc Discourse" Journal of 
Interdisciplinary Studies Vol.l3, no.l (2001):51.
2 Zoe Knox "The Symphonic Ideal: The Moscow Patriarchate's Post-Soviet Leadership" Europe- 
Asia Studies Vol. 55, No. 4 (2003): 575.
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A SWINGING PENDULUM OF RELIGIOUS AND POLITICAL SENTIMENT
Church-state relations in Russia and later in the Soviet Union are not 
unlike a pendulum, swinging from one direction to another. As mentioned in 
the first chapter of this thesis, the three primary possibilities for Church-state 
relations are sympkonia, complete separation and weak establishment. The 
relationship has changed from a time when the Russian Orthodox Church had a 
strong influence over a weak state to a totalitarian subservience to the state. 
Public perceptions and sentiments and the institutional interests of both Church 
and state have influenced this relationship in the past, and continue to shape it 
today. Although a symphonic ideal is part of Orthodox theology, the Russian 
Orthodox Church has not had a symphonic relationship with the Russian State 
since prior to Peter the Great. Peter's reforms placed the Church at varying 
degrees under the authority of the state, and the Church has never again enjoyed 
the full cooperation with the state that is the basis for a symphonic relationship. 
Throughout Russia's imperial history this relationship changed with the tsars as 
each tsar chose different dynamics within that relationship. This trend did not 
change when imperial Russia imploded and was replaced by the Soviet Union. 
Despite claims to the contrary, Russia has never been a secular nation in which 
the Church and the state were completely separate from each other.
Even under the Soviet regime, touted as an atheistic state, the Church was 
not separate. The Church was relegated to being under the thumb of the state 
and under the authority of the Council for Religious Affairs. The relationship
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remained thus until 1988. Then, while still under the Council for Religious 
Affairs, the Church became an ally for Gorbachev and the relationship changed 
to one in which the Church again lent its support to the state, which the state 
accepted and rewarded. During this time many of the restrictions on the Church 
were relaxed and the Church saw an increase in its abilities to worship for the 
first time in decades.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, throughout much of post­
communist Europe the relationship between the Church and the state, became 
one of a "partial establishment of religion"^ in which Churches are 'ranked' in 
accordance to their traditional and historical significance. This would be similar 
to a weak establishment of religion, as discussed in Chapter One. As the state has 
searched for opportunities to strengthen its legitimacy, the Church has been able 
to exercise greater influence. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought also a 
collapse of ideology that had been incorporated into the daily lives of the people 
for seven decades. The Church, with links to pre-Soviet history, culture and faith 
has, with some success, tried to fill this void left by the collapse of the Soviet 
ideology.
INTERNAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
Within the Church there have been many divisions. These divisions have 
been primarily ideological, whether between Old Believers and reformists, or
' Knox, "Symphonic Ideal," 579.
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between conservatives and liberals. These divisions have impacted relations 
with the state, especially when the divisions were consequences of state policies. 
The relationship between Tsar Alexis and Patriarch Nikon in the seventeenth 
century created conflict. Nikon became more of a partner in the operations of the 
state, rather than just an advisor. The power that Nikon had enjoyed within the 
state allowed Nikon to institute his own reforms within Church ritual and 
tradition. These reforms divided followers into those who supported Nikon and 
those who did not.
Another example of the influence of state policy on the Church is the 
further division which erupted after the Bolsheviks came to power and 
Metropolitan Sergei pledged the Church's allegiance to the new state power. 
This division, moreso than any before, split the Church to such a degree that a 
new Church was developed -  the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad -  with its 
authority lying outside the boundaries of Russia and the Soviet Union. The 
relationship that the Church had with the Soviet state was one that would follow 
the Church throughout the 20* century. Divisions arose anew after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union -  both within Russia and within the independent nations that 
arose out of the former Soviet Union.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, Ukraine became an independent state. 
This independence spread throughout the population, including the Orthodox 
community. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church was re-established 
and asserted its right to be independent of the Russian Orthodox Church in
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Moscow. Furthermore, a Kiev Patriarchate was established, rejecting the 
authority of the Moscow Patriarchate. The Kiev Patriarchate has not received 
canonical recognition from the other Orthodox Patriarchates.
Within the Moscow Patriarchate, divisions were bubbling to the surface as 
more knowledge surfaced regarding the collaboration of clergymen with the 
KGB. Some high standing clergymen, including the current Patriarch, were 
agents of the KGB and collaborated with the state in order to further the state's 
agenda.
The level of outcry due to the KGB collaboration diminished from a call 
demanding the complete removal of key collaborators (which would have 
included six standing members of the Holy Synod) to silent acceptance of the 
compromises made in the name of survival. The division within the Church 
between the reformers and the conservatives has continued into the 21®‘ century.
Father Gleb Yakunin was one of the most vocal of clergy against the KGB 
collaboration. He also argued for reforms within the Church in both ritual and 
practice and fought to remain politically active, even after such activity was 
disallowed by the Church hierarchy, and was rewarded by being defrocked by 
the Church. Father Yakunin was not the only dissident within the Church who 
argued for reforms.
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MUTUAL BENEFITS IN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
At various times throughout Russia's history, the state has used the 
Church to further its agenda, whether in policy or to strengthen the state's 
legitimacy. Stalin used the Church to rally the people during World War II. 
Gorbachev later extended an olive branch to the Church in order to further his 
agenda for glasnost and perestroika. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin 
furthered the relationship with the Church in order to have support for the new 
government's legitimacy. Putin has also pursued this path.
That is not to say that the relationship between the Church and the state is 
one-sided. The Church has also used the state in order to achieve its own goals. 
Two recent examples are the case studies included in Chapter Five discussing the 
actions of the Church regarding the work of the CoMission within public 
education and the art exhibit at the Sakharov Museum. In the first case the 
Church sought to promote Orthodoxy (not just Christian values) in public 
education and in the second case, the Church disliked the content of the exhibit 
and used its influence with the state to encourage the prosecution of both the 
organizers and the artists of the show.
TENSIONS IN CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
Despite the on-again, off-again relationship between the Church and the state in 
Russia, there are tensions that arise when the opinion of the Church clashes with 
the popular opinion of the day. An example of this is the cycle in sentiment
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towards the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there was 
excitement in Russia about the Iron Curtain opening and tolerance of Western 
influence within Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church, which is relatively 
isolationist, did not support the opening up to the West, especially when it 
enabled the influx of foreign missionaries. Support for the Church decreased at 
this time, due in part to its anti-West sentiment. As the tide changed and 
sentiment towards the West became more negative, the Church again increased 
in popularity, or more accurately, the faith that the Church represented became 
more popular. As cycles are continuous, it is likely that sentiment for the West 
will again become popular, and the Church will once again be found battling 
social forces for change.
The Church and state have also differed on issues of foreign policy, 
especially those regarding the Catholic Church in Ukraine. While the Church 
does not want concessions made to the Catholic Church, the state conceded some 
of its positions towards the Catholic Church in order to have a better relationship 
with the Vatican and to satisfy the West's appeal for freedom of conscience in 
Russia. This is likely to cause tension between Church and state for some time. 
The Church holds strict views of other religions, especially those it considers 
being from the "outside", and demands a privileged position. The state however, 
feels pressure from the Western world to endorse religious pluralism and to 
allow complete freedom of conscience and freedom of religion. The state has 
made some concessions towards the Russian Orthodox Church, the 1997
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Freedom of Conscience law being an example, but the state must walk a fine 
balance between appeasing the Church and not alienating the West, or 
alternatively, appeasing the West and alienating the Church.
CURRENT SITUATION OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS
The relationship between the Church and state in Russia today is one of zoeak 
establishment. The Russian Orthodox Church does hold a position of privilege 
above other religions in Russia, even the other 'traditional' religions of Judaism, 
Buddhism and Islam. The Church does exert influence over the state and uses 
the state in order to further its own agenda. However, the Church also walks a 
fine line between the balance of cooperation and subservience. To be linked too 
closely to the state may lead the Church back down the path of being just another 
branch of state bureaucracy, but to distance itself too far from the state would be 
to lose its influence on matters with which the Church is concerned. This 
relationship is not likely to change too much in the near future. Given the three 
main models, weak establishment is probably the one model that makes the most 
sense for contemporary Russia. The Church and the state need to find a balance 
between symphonia and complete separation, and not fall into the historical trap in 
which one, either the Church or the state, overpowers the other. Such a situation 
is not conducive to the ideals upholding democracy as the tables would turn to 
either theocracy or dictatorship.
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While travelling in Russia, especially in the rural areas, it is easy to see 
that the Russian Orthodox Church is still alive and well and shaping the faith of 
many people throughout the country. Monasteries are being rebuilt, individuals 
are again giving their lives to the work of the Russian Orthodox Church and 
churches are being restored. The efforts for restoration are more common in the 
larger centres such as Moscow and the capitals of republics, while the rural areas 
wait for churches to be restored or, in many cases, rebuilt. Within the larger 
centres however, there is a palpable feeling of pluralism. Upon speaking with 
one young man, I was told that the Russian Orthodox Church was for "old 
people" whereas the Western religions were more popular among the younger 
generation. He, himself, attended a Gospel Church. This dichotomy between the 
urban centres and the rural communities may not last long as foreign 
missionaries are taking their teachings into the far outreaches of Russia, even into 
the Arctic tundra.
The division between the Moscow Patriarchate and Ukraine is also not 
likely to be resolved as the Ukrainian Orthodox Church -  Kiev Patriarchate is 
considering merging with the Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church and 
severing its ties completely with Moscow. This would be a great loss to the 
Russian Orthodox Church in terms of numbers of followers as well as a loss in 
property. The state fears that if the Russian Orthodox Church loses its authority 
over Orthodoxy in Ukraine, it will be the final severing of Ukraine from Russia.
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Church-State relations in Russia cannot be compared to those in most 
Western countries. No Church in the west exerts the influence over the state that 
the Russian Orthodox Church does. The history of close ties between the Church 
and the state is much more rooted in Russia than in Western countries. The state 
is aware of the cultural role that the Russian Orthodox Church plays in national 
identity and that while people may not completely support the institution, they 
support the faith that the institution represents. This relationship holds some 
consequences to the furthering of pluralism in Russia. Pluralism, in which all 
religions are equal under the law, will never take hold in Russia while the 
Russian Orthodox Church maintains a position of privilege. The opportunity for 
change arose when the Soviet Union collapsed and the Western world, with its 
promises of freedom and liberal ideas, was opened up to Russians. But when the 
opportunities of the West did not provide immediate solutions for the 
quandaries of Russian society, people became disillusioned in the promises of 
the West and the Church once again regained some authority among Russians.
With the 1997 law still in place, there is a legislated limitation on foreign 
missionaries to spread their word to the Russian people. This law has been 
maintained despite its conflict with the constitution adopted in 1993. While this 
legislation is not supportive of religious pluralism, the relationship it does 
support, based on loeak establishment, will work in Russia, since it has been said: 
"the effort to banish moral and religious argument from the public realm for the 
sake of political agreement may end by impoverishing political discourse and
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eroding the moral and civic resources necessary to self-government"^. Perhaps 
the most that can be asked of a country that has spent most of the 20* century 
under atheistic totalitarianism is for one religion to rise above others. While this 
may offend the sensibilities of pluralists everywhere, it is likely the most realistic 
response to the challenges of post-Soviet Russia.
What are the consequences of a relationship between Church and state 
rooted in weak establishment? Weak establishment can be supportive of pluralism, if 
so inclined, and if there are defined limits of the privileges extended to the 
majority religion. However, is it possible for a state to maintain equality between 
the faiths under weak establishment? In Russia, religious liberty for minority 
religions has not yet blossomed, and is constrained by the application of existing 
laws and by the influence of the Russian Orthodox Church. The present model 
theoretically allows for the religious beliefs of politicians to influence political 
decisions, something that might also further erode the equality of faiths. But 
such influence is also found in stable democratic countries in the world.® The 
weak establishment of the Orthodox Church allows the political benefits of 
legitimacy and identity that the Church has to offer both state and society, and 
yet at the same time, constrains the influence of the Church in the interests of 
pluralism.
 ^Choudhury, 54.
 ^In the U.S., for example, a constitutionalized secular state, personal religious beliefs of elected 
political leaders commonly impact public decision making (i.e. abortion, euthanasia).
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The alternatives to zveak establishment are less attractive. Neither symphonia 
nor secularization are void of weaknesses. While symphonia allows for a strong 
focus on tradition, acknowledges the role religion plays in the development of 
society, and cultivates a strong foundation for unity and identity, it is not 
supportive of pluralism. It also silences the voice of the secular, further 
bureaucratizes both the state and the Church while allowing interference of one 
in the other, and finally, has managed only marginal support for an individual's 
right to choose his or her faith. Within such a system, state laws can be based on 
religious texts, and individual rights are devalued by society.
Secularization, on the other hand, disallows both interference of the state in 
the Church, and religious interference in state affairs. While secularization is very 
supportive of both individual rights and religious pluralism, it excludes the voice 
of religion from the public sphere and undermines the positive role the Church 
might play in Russia's link with its past. While the Soviet Union was not a truly 
secularized state, religion of God was replaced with the religion of state, which 
left people with a void when the state collapsed.
In Russia, both the Russian Orthodox Church and the state appear willing 
to embrace the weaknesses of zveak establishment in order to benefit from the 
strengths of that model. However, there is no commitment to zveak establishment. 
The present relationship between the Russian Orthodox Church and the state 
could just be another point along the pendulum swing through political and 
religious relations. The Russian Orthodox Church might desire greater
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commitment from the government of the day and it is difficult at this stage to 
suggest that existing tensions will not provide impetus for further movement or 
redefinition of the relationship. The Russian Orthodox Church supports a strong 
state, as long as the Church can exert some influence and maintain some measure 
of privilege. The reality that "no other nation needed a strong state to sustain its 
mere survival in this world so much as Russia did"^ is as true in Russia's history 
as it is today. The two swords of power in Russia continue to work to give 
honour to the Motherland. Russia is still in a position of disempowerment due 
to its lack of financial resources and stable economy. A strong state, defined 
through Putin's 'managed democracy' seems to be what is needed in order to 
stabilize the country. The Church, for its part, is continuing to be supportive of 
this role for the state and supports initiatives as long as the influence of the 
Church is maintained. While predictions as to the future of Church and state 
relations in Russia are difficult, it is likely that the cycle will continue. However, 
what direction the pendulum swings next, and at what pace it travels along the 
arc, is still uncertain.
' Hugh Ragsdale The Russian Tragedy: The Burden of History (USA: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1996), 48.
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